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The history of politics and the politics of history: colonial discourse and 'post-colonial' Indian modernity

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Abstract

*Colonial ideology and dominant Indian historical imagination bear a striking resemblance because they share a common chemistry of ideas. British ruling class ideology and its internalization by the Indian middle class, modern class formation in colonial India, state policy, caste and religious identities were inter-related and always influenced by the exigencies of the colonial state and its Indian allies. British colonialism reduced India to an inferior subject of history conceived and fashioned by Eurocentrism. At least from the late eighteenth century, if not earlier, this subject was moulded for the first time by a ruling class whose ideological roots were located thousands of miles away in England. Colonialism wrote and made Indian history simultaneously. The growth of westernization in India affected the historicization of Indian consciousness in the long term. The primacy accorded to history in colonial education influenced the process of imagining nations and communities, social reform and religious revival among the various Indian communities in colonial India. Much of historical thinking in postcolonial India can be traced to the ideological and religious discourses represented by influential individuals and texts of the colonial past. We need only refer to Warren Hastings, William Jones, Edmund Burke, James Mill, Charles Grant, William Bentinck,Thomas Macaulay and John Stuart Mill among others, to prove this beyond doubt. The manner in which the past was made to serve imagined communities and nations during the latter half of the nineteenth century in India has stayed with us because Indian bourgeois ideology, **in general**, is based on a model of modernity which remains essentially colonial despite the intellectual pretensions of the Indian elite to the contrary. In India the nationalist imagination of the nation derived its essentials from a colonial historiography which was biased against the colonial subjects to begin and end with. Despite several advances in Indian historiography since 1947 the trope of ancient greatness, medieval backwardness and a future based on the emulation of an idealized European history continues to dominate the historical imagination of the Westernized Indian middle class. This continues to happen because true decolonization never occurred in post colonial India. In fact the last two decades have witnessed a resurgence of Westernization among the Indian middle class with intriguing results.*

The history of politics and the politics of history: colonial discourse and 'post-colonial' Indian modernity[1]

Rude nations seem to derive a peculiar gratification from pretensions to a remote antiquity. As a boastful and turgid vanity distinguishes remarkably the oriental nations they have in most instances carried their claims extravagantly high.
- James Mill[2]

Speak out, tell the truth, refuse to accept cliches and ideological constructions, examine and reflect concretely on the nonsense produced by the media…There is no other way of achieving the minimum goals of a decent life without also translating ourselves from a primitive to a modern condition in which for the first time in our modern history leaders are directly accountable for their policies to the people.
Edward W. Said[3]

I

Since the industrial revolution and the *Enlightenment*, which is said to have occurred in parts of Western Europe in the 18 th and 19 th centuries, the tension between the values for which the *Enlightenment* stood and the domination of the modern world by imperialism and colonialism has characterized world history. The history of modern imperialism and western cultural domination of non western societies tells us that the promise of universal human values held forth to humanity by the *Enlightenment* was, from the very beginning of that elusive phenomenon, not meant for the *historically immature* non white colonial subjects and slaves. Since then the cosmetic changes in political power and social *mentality* which have occurred in a given historical period and its corresponding knowledge episteme suggest that intellectual continuities have remained strong over generations despite the struggles waged against colonialism by the colonized. These continuities, the enormous and still growing literature on the subject proves, are underpinned by modern imperialism and colonialism which have assumed new forms at least since the end of the Second World War[4]. Thus we must assume that capitalist ideology, like the class societies to which it corresponds, has no expiry date and re-surfaces *ad infinitum* like old wine in new bottles in different chronological and social contexts. Its contemporary name is *globalization* which boils down to the rule of the entrenched *corporatocracy* in the West and their compradors in the so-called developing countries[5]. The progress of history since 1989 suggests that the world has certainly not become flat after the Cold War much against the hopes and prescriptions held out to humanity by the ideologues of capitalism.

Globalization has coincided with the rise of an ostensibly new idea of India which seeks to bypass or demonize Islam against which the West is waging a war today after the end of the Cold War and the demise of the 'evil empire' [read the Star Wars inspired description of the USSR]. In this context what an eminent historian noted in 1972 of developments in Indian historiography during the colonial period appears true even now:

The search for or discovery of the Indian past resulted in a number of interpretations of the past. These were notions which were constantly repeated since they were first enunciated and which have become stereotypes of Indian history and culture. Even though today they are being questioned, they are still widespread. Some of these stereotypes are related to the needs of imperialism, for economic imperialism had its counterpart in cultural domination. Historical writing coming from this source aimed at explaining the past in a manner which facilitated imperial rule.[6]

Much of Indian historiography is reminiscent of the nineteenth century intellectual fashions because the intellectual premises of modernity have not changed fundamentally since the colonial period of Indian history. Indian bourgeois modernity, *inter alia*, hinges on the history of India produced by British colonialism and buttressed by the internalization of a neo-colonial *Orientalism*. This history, *in general*, is a living room discourse which glorifies a pre-Islamic *scientific* Indian past. This glorification underwrites a claim to westernized modernity in the context of globalization. The Indian nation in this 'clash of civilizations' view is imagined as a *primarilyoriginal* Hindu space amenable to the demands of modernity. The arrival of the native on the stage of international modernity and the future of India is thus made to depend on this hallucination. In tandem with this the achievements of ancient Hindus are exaggerated beyond the limits of reason and common sense – an established characteristic of imperialist discourse and religious nationalism. Naturally, the thriving heterodoxy present in historical and contemporary India is either ignored or underestimated by this *savarna* Hindu view of Indian history.

This yoking of history to religious communalism suggests that a transition to modernity from ancient India*could* not happen because of the medievalism imported into India by Islam. It has been pointed out that this "dressing up of the colonial view" masquerades as a new history of India but in reality closes the Indian mind to reason[7]. The point is not to disprove the wild assertions of Hindu nationalism but to understand their ideological role in India where communalism, stoked by religious strife, has become *respectable* in the last thirty years[8]. The assertion that a decadent 'Muslim' India was responsible for the rise of British colonialism in India is implicit in such arguments. This squares with the colonial view of Indian history according to which the British were left with little choice but to civilize a people laboring under Oriental Despotism - the Muslims were the despots and the Hindus their suppressed subjects. In this history Islam was defeated by the West but continues to blight the Hindu potential for modernization[9]. This history appropriates Buddhism, Jainism, Bhakti and Sikhism to Hinduism and pillories Christian and Sufi traditions as foreign influences.

This essay deconstructs the dominant Indian historical imagination with reference to the foundations of modern Indian historiography. It claims that the popular ideas of ancient glory and medieval backwardness are complementary to imagining a past which conditions the historical self-perception of the 'great' Indian middle class. The story of ancient India, and its descent into medieval darkness, was patterned on the linear chronological tri-partition of European history and developed by a modern historicized thinking internalized by educated Indians in colonial and post

colonial India. Above all, the *historicization* of thinking in colonial India meant a "process in which the experience of change came to occupy a pivotal place in the cultural orientation of man, and the study of these changes" based on both theory and empirical research[10]. Valorizing bourgeois modernity as universally valid and condemning the medieval world and the Orient were indispensable to the dominant colonial historical discourse which colored the work of influential British intellectuals like Macaulay[11] . Ultimately the epistemological basis of colonial modernity, which justified its success or failure with reference to Indian backwardness as the case may have been, was used by the various Indian nationalisms to construct their own discourses. History, which was the philosophical essence of this epistemology, became implicated in both the colonizing project and the reactions it evoked among various Indian communities[12]. Since the colonial historical episteme affected Indian community self-perception and produced the community based *nations* in nineteenth century India the question of one nation to which all Indian communities would subscribe remained problematic. Ultimately the difference between religious and secular nationalism was *reduced to a question of preferred political practice*. The superficial difference between the *programmatic communalism* of religious nationalism and the *pragmatic communalism* of secular nationalism in colonial and post-colonial India can be traced to this fact. Hindu and secular nationalism both *presume* that Hindus are *essentially* more accommodating and non violent compared with Muslims. Both deliberately overlook the caste and sectarian violence characteristic of Indian history in general. The Hindu nationalist bemoans Hindu docility whereas the secular nationalist praises the social flexibility of Hinduism. The enduring popularity of these views decades after 1947 forces us to reconsider the relationship of historical memory and identity politics in contemporary India[13]. According to Gottlob much of this was produced by the colonial *historicization* of the Indian mind:

In general, it can be said about the religious reform movements of Hindus and Muslims that their adoption of modern Western categories in the effort to provide their traditions with a new foundation did not always facilitate understanding between the communities, but rather hardened the lines of demarcation.[14]

II

Just a few years before the founding of the Indian National Congress Bankimchandra Chatterjee, eminent Bengali intellectual and author of *Anandamath* , observed that a "nation with historical reminiscences of its past glory tries to retain its glory, and if this be lost, it tries to regain it."[15] The point is to understand how these modern "reminiscences" emerged in colonial India and how was India refashioned in a new knowledge episteme. The social diffusion of colonial ideology and the influence of the 'superior' culture of the colonizer in British India affected Indians in myriad ways. In the nineteenth century the indigenous colonial elites, Hindu, Muslim and others, began to reform their religions due to the influence of *a* history which they learnt from their colonial rulers. This socio-religious reform, which was radically different from the humanism advocated by the *Bhakti* tradition of India, was often aimed at eliminating the non-modern, and often *syncretic*, popular religious practices from the everyday life of the people. But, while the *Bhakti* was humane

without being modern, religious reform during the colonial period was modern without necessarily being humane - often it needed and manufactured an 'other' to justify and sustain its communitarian imagination. The aim of *Bhakti* was reconciliation in contrast to the development of the friction laden modern nation during the colonial period. The epistemological shift from the pre colonial to the colonial in the source of this reform had profound consequences for the future of social identities in India. In colonial India the defining and dividing boundaries between the mainstream and marginal or majority and minority were drawn with the help of colonial pedagogy and policy[16]. The philosophically constructed *binary* difference between the *modern* based on reason and science and the *traditional* based on unreason and superstition was central to communal reform in colonial India undertaken by the elites to *civilize* their respective communities. The historical construction of communities, and later nations, was inherent to the assertion that communities had to modernize in keeping with the historical needs of modernity. The departure from tradition and pre-modern popular practices was essential to this modernizing project. The *reminiscences* which nationalist scholars desired to forge and awaken a nation together were located in this matrix of ideas produced in India by its colonial experience.

The modern imagination of Indian history had a long term impact on post-colonial society in south Asia. For example, the theory of the martial races, as part of an overarching colonial anthropology *and* excessive military recruitment from the Punjab from the 1880s, continued to influence the history of Pakistan*and* India decades after 1947. Another example is the long term differentiated impact of the Cornwallis System and Munro System in different parts of India. Cornwallis wanted to create a class of improving landlords in India based on the right to private property in land, whereas Munro, a Scottish romantic, glorified the yeoman peasant and claimed a greater familiarity with Indian village republics. Nonetheless, both approaches emanated from the impulse to implicate India in the historical mission of a reforming British colonialism. A third example was the education system developed in India by policy makers like Macaulay with long term implications. With the establishment of British colonialism the backwardness India became an unassailable historical fact and a source of relentless intellectual examination, ideological obsession and public anxiety. The British and the colonial indigenous elites wanted to reform a country which, to begin the project, was *historicized* in their shared imagination. The Indian subaltern classes were peripheral to the various elite schemes aimed at modernizing a backward country although the Indian elite often deluded itself with the rhetoric of popular representation and intellectual enlightenment. The argument that India's poverty was a result of British rule developed steadily in Indian nationalist thought from the nineteenth century but ultimately this argument could not displace the community based political nationalism from the political practice of Indians. The prospect of eradicating poverty from India by *not* following the Western model of industrial development has remained alien to dominant Indian thinking since the nineteenth century – rare is the Indian economist who has read *Small is Beautiful*.

Colonial ideology comprised numerous strands which converged to create the colonial discourse in India. Some strands, despite their superficial differences, proved complementary in creating a discourse of India's past in tune with both colonial administrative convenience and elite Indian

attempts to consolidate religious identities and rediscover their own national or local histories with the aid of a historiography introduced to India by colonialism. The early Orientalists and Whigs might have examined India's past differently but *together* they fashioned a *mode of historical thinking* which conditioned the worldview of the British and Indian colonial elites. The British *discovered,* enumerated and, in the process, refashioned the various Indian communities during the nineteenth century. After 1857 the census, among other things, provided the vision of a political future to these communities; it emerged as a tool of community self perceptions, a social understanding of comparative identities and a possible document which could be used as bargaining counter of the colonial state. With the passage of time the Indian elites redefined communities and constructed imaginary nations by using the ideological material provided by the colonial discourse on India. In sum, the colonial experiment in India proved, that the mental colonization of Indians was the *sina qua non* of British colonialism.

The process of perceiving, understanding, classifying, ordering, administering and exploiting India began with conquests of the English East India Company (hereafter Company) in mid-eighteenth century. The Battles of Plassey (1757) and Buxar (1764) and their economic fallout transformed the Company into a State. By the late eighteenth century, the period of mercantilist loot gave way to systematic governance designed to address the payments problem of the Company and facilitate the transfer of wealth from India to Britain. However, the emergence of the organized exploitation of India raised several questions. What, the English debated, was the best way of ensuring a steady flow of revenue into the treasury? Which system of education would be best suited to Indians? What were the best ways of understanding and ruling the natives? What was to be made of India's social diversity, customs and the numerous languages? What was India's true history and what would define the British attitude towards these? These were difficult questions raised by the English who were themselves evolving a new *British* identity in relation to the colonies and the industrial and French revolutions at the time. America had recently been lost. India was being gained and, in the process, refashioned. France was in a revolution disliked by the British ruling class and the Company was being attacked by the free traders and Parliament in England. The material and ideological basis of the British Empire, to which colonialism had become central in the eighteenth century, was related to these historical developments[17]. The expanding Empire would define the self-perception of the colonizer and colonized simultaneously from the beginning of the nineteenth century well into an unknown future.

From the late eighteenth century Orientalism, Liberalism and Evangelicalism emerged as the most influential schools of thought conditioning British policy in India. The Evangelicals viewed India as a pagan site of moral decay and this view was aligned with Liberal – Utilitarian views on Christianity and *national* progress[18]. By the early nineteenth century European intellectuals had divided world history into the well known four *stadial* model which emerged from the French and Scottish enlightenment thought[19]. To the colonial subject's paganism *and* implied decadence Christianity and Liberalism spoke in the chorus of Christian and Western superiority. Nonetheless, the debate on India's future included select Indian opinion. Warren Hastings sought Indian opinion on numerous issues confronting Company rule in Bengal. This opinion was rendered, foremost,

by sections of the Indian elite who collaborated with the British and wanted to please the new rulers of India. Thus the intermediary elite, whom the British treated as the representative intellectuals of the Indian masses, positioned themselves in a profitable position between the British and the mass of Indian people. This collaboration influenced the process of ruling and codifying Indian society in the interest of the British and their Indian elite collaborators[20]. This native-colonial collaboration may support the view that colonialism in India was a hybrid system produced by the enmeshing of at least two dominant cultures. Though there is some merit in this view, it should not be forgotten that this hybrid worked *against* the Indian peasants and workers whose surplus sustained *both* colonialism and the Indian elite.

Orientalism, as a way of perceiving and theorizing the Orient, had existed in Europe from the medieval period. Its existence pre-dated the late eighteenth century when it arrived in India as an officially patronized school of thought. Since the medieval times an Orientalist in Europe was someone who evinced special interest in the epistemology of the Eastern cultures. These cultures were supposed to begin on the borders of Europe in Turkey and were seen extending all the way to Japan. *In the beginning, an Orientalist was an area specialist who generally appreciated his subject.* The Germans often led the field and there is reason to believe that many of the early Orientalists were convinced that the Orient had a lot to teach the Europeans. The tendency to see the orient and occident as different cultures was strongly marked in much of European writing in the 19 th century. Balzac and Flaubert, without necessarily condemning the orient, described it as a mysterious place . In modern literature the Orient was more often than not described in exotic and feminine terms. In Germany the academics of Indology, which glorified an ancient spiritual Vedic Hindu India, probably evolved from an obsessive interest in the orient found among a set of intellectuals who reacted to the spiritually dry industrial materialism of the West. Indology produced the long-lived idea that the similarity between Vedic Hindus and ancient Europeans was destroyed by the march of history. However, the politics of Indology argued, precisely because of this dissimilarity India and the West could learn different things from each other. India could help the West transcend materialism whereas the West could help develop India technologically. But the precondition of this lay in India's re-discovery of its ancient glory with the help of tools central to the practice of modern historiography – India needed a Renaissance prior to its conversion to Christianity.

The early Orientalists wanted to understand the historical evolution of similarity and difference between the East and West but, unlike modern western anthropologists, most of them neither visited nor lived in Asia. Their arguments were based on the numerous medieval and early modern travelogues and documents found in Europe. These documents were notoriously biased and in need of correctives which the colonized were never allowed to provide. The views of the Orientalists must be examined in the overall intellectual and social context informing their work. Many Orientalists and Indologists were committed Christians but their views on India ranged from outright condemnation, as in the writings of Charles Grant, to a glorification of ancient India. In either case India became a myth produced by colonial knowledge. Hence to assume that early, pre-colonial, Orientalism could indeed easily offer credible perspectives on the orient would be

simplistic. Some Indologists, like Max Mueller, enamored by the achievements of ancient Hindus as they were, did not restrict their vision of India to a narrative of bygone greatness. They were convinced that the vigor of an Aryan past had equipped the Hindus to approach historical progress and embrace Christianity with confidence. If Europe and India had a common Aryan past it was reasonable to assume then, *as it seems now*, that they could have a common, morally uplifting, future. Semitic influences were excluded from this Christian-Orientalist vision of India. The Middle East was a geographical and cultural space which could easily be ignored by this projected historical linking of India and the West; the West had geographically bypassed and culturally overcome Islam and India could do the same provided it re-discovered its ancient glory – a task which *Hindutva* would later take upon itself.

While the Orient was reduced to a subject of Eurocentric inquiry in European Orientalist literature, Orientalism underwent a major transformation during the nineteenth century. European visions of non-Europeans evolved from the early sixteenth century when the Spanish and Portuguese colonial empires were founded. The social and cultural transformation of Europe between 1500 and 1800 AD restructured the European knowledge of the Orient. In fact, since the medieval crusades Christian views on Islam had acquired an aggressive tone. Moreover, the *academic* meaning of Orientalism acquired new connotations in the twentieth century due to the scholarship of Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault, Edward Said and Noam Chomsky. Finally, Orientalism was deconstructed by Edward Said in his famous book. Using the critique of European power developed by Gramsci and Foucault, Said claimed that Orientalism was a pretentious discourse of imperialism and colonialism. It was a knowledge produced by modern western capitalism desirous of exercising *total* power over the orient. As a dominant Eurocentric discourse it was inherently biased against the African and Asian cultures and therefore had to be rejected in the effort to decolonize the mind of the colonized. According to Said, the late eighteenth century was an important chronological, political, cultural and racial point of departure in the history of modern colonialism. Since then Orientalism developed as a "corporate institution for dealing with the Orient" through the pedagogic and bureaucratic mechanisms of western imperialism. Since its publication Said's *Orientalism* has become central to a post modern critique of colonial and post colonial modernity[21]. Given the trajectories of Western imperialism in our neo-colonial times the contemporary significance of Said's book can hardly be under estimated.

In response to Said it can be said that numerous European travel records pre-date the development of modern colonialism. Some German Orientalist scholars were geographically removed from the political sites of colonialism which produced a discourse of colonial-racial domination. These works emerged in a period and locale unrelated to modern imperialism and hence cannot be equated with the colonial project central to Said's thesis. Nonetheless saying all this amounts to reading too much into Said's submissions. Critics may even insist, in my view incorrectly, that Said has inadvertently provided an intellectual basis to an Islamism which blames the West for much of Islam's contemporary problems[22]. It can also be said that all dominant powers produce discourses about the people they colonize so there is nothing exceptional in Said's submissions.

No matter what is written of Said no one can deny that his work, when it appeared, was a pioneering way of looking at the intellectual machinations of modern colonialism.

In sum the point of departure in Said's work remains important. The transformation of some European countries, especially Britain and France, into modern colonial powers during the early nineteenth century created the point of *civilizational departure* in the history of modern imperialism. We must also allude to the colonial prejudices generated by Spain, Portugal and Holland prior to this point of departure. These three, as the early modern colonizers practicing slavery, laid down the ground rules for modern colonialism. It can certainly be claimed, in a fit response to Said's detractors, that the knowledge of the colonial other generated by the elite of these imperialist countries comprises the *prehistory* of modern and contemporary Orientalism.

III

In the latter half of the eighteenth century the transition from a prehistory of Orientalism to historicized Orientalism was made in India. In trade, diplomacy and warfare the Company had developed a working relationship with the regionally differentiated, though socially similar, commercial and ruling elites of Indian society since the beginning of the seventeenth century. This relationship was transformed in the eighteenth century because of the disintegration of the Mughal Empire. Following this the regional polities in India could not check the rise of British power. By the time the Napoleonic wars began the British emerged as the paramount power in India and set into motion the process of establishing a colonial empire in south Asia led by a handful of Europeans. In this context the British knew that they could rule a vast and complex country like India only in alliance with its traditional elites and hence by its very nature British colonialism tried its best to retain the continuities of Indian history against the grain of changes its economic impact on India was bound to create. Thus it has been asserted with some reason that the demographic, political and educational compulsions of the British made them accept Brahmanism as a convenient *system* for the subjugation of the Indian masses[23].

Abiding by the Indian religious texts, by which its native elite swore, promoted the feeling of historical continuity among the British. Their rule could thus claim *dharmic* justification on grounds of being in consonance with textual privileges enjoyed by India's ruling orders since the ancient times. During the nineteenth century the classification and codification of Indians into groups, and their numerous re-discovered texts, acquired 'scientific' validity and widespread elite acceptance. Finally, "the colonial era's far greater dissemination of printed matter, the increase in literacy, and the development of communications technology, shored up the plausibility of the orthodoxy's claims."[24] Thus the traditional elites within the colonized society used the institutions of colonial modernity to strengthen their grip over their respective communities. In due course this hegemony was challenged by movements led by backward caste and Dalit intellectuals and leaders like Phule and Ambedkar who utilized colonial modernity to challenge the caste-orthodoxy of the

upper castes. However, and especially in the case of Ambedkar's education, the role of pre-colonial anti-Brahminism which thrived in the Maratha dominated princely states like Baroda and Kolhapur should be noticed.

The early British administrators and scholars established the belief that India was an ancient land which must be ruled in with ancient Hindu scriptures in the case of Hindus and written medieval scriptures with Quranic injunctions in the case of Muslims. Since the English were Christians who believed in religious scriptures their search for equivalent texts among the Hindus led them to the Brahamanical texts on law, culture, history and customs. This set the context within which a new kind of modern knowledge eventually developed in India. This rediscovery of hoary India was done through the unearthing and codification of its Sanskrit Vedic texts by British scholars with the assistance of the Brahmans. Sanskrit was identified, like Latin in the case of ancient Europe, as India's language of classical learning. Ultimately a specific Orientalist understanding of India's past, present and, possible future, developed as an intellectual project dictated by India's new colonial masters with the help of their Indian collaborators. This gave selected groups of Brahmans in the three Presidencies considerable intellectual and administrative space in the growing colonial dispensation from the late eighteenth century. Thus Brahmanism, now backed by the intellectual prestige and discursive institutions of the colonial state, began commanding a new legitimacy in the context of colonial modernity.

It can be said that such processes were active during the Sultanate and Mughal periods of Indian history in which the ruling elites drew their knowledge of Indian religious customs from high caste Hindus and Muslims both. In fact Dara Shikoh, Shah Jahan's elder son and ill fated heir apparent, was getting the *Upanishads* translated into Persian with the help of learned Brahmans before being defeated and killed by Aurangzeb. However, Dara Shikoh was *not* William Jones and the mid seventeenth century did not comprise the intellectual departure on which the modern thesis of Orientalism rests. Compared with the seventeenth century, the industrial revolution, colonialism and modernity made an unprecedented difference to India's future in the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty first centuries. The *imagined futures* which emerged from the collaborative networks developed in India by British colonialism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century cannot be anticipated in the social collaboration of elites which sustained the pre-colonial polities in India despite temptations to the contrary.

IV

With respect to the *historicization* of the Indian mind Orientalism discovered a cultural similarity between ancient Europe and ancient India with the help of comparative philology. By reappearing in nineteenth century Indology, the presumptions of Orientalism defined the divergence between the *Occident* and *Orient* as a binary opposition between the *material* and *spiritual* with clear political implications; Indian nationalism found this convenient later. In line with a theory of

comparative advantage, to borrow a phrase from the economists, the European Romantics wished to learn spirituality from India and India, in return and with British help, would imbibe material-technological lessons from the West. Orientalism pushed back the historical chronology of India into an ancient glorious period which was perceived as being *markedly different* from the later periods characterized by violent invasions, historical stagnation and cultural decline. Orientalism's confrontation with the Semitic tradition thus became the bane of Indian history. Dorothy Figueria has demonstrated how in Voltaire's influential imagination India had emerged as the cradle of Aryan civilization unsullied by Judaism in comparison with an Aryan Europe polluted by Semitism in the 18 th century[25]. This view gathered strength in the 19 th century with each passing decade as both European and Indian intellectuals subscribed to it. Ultimately the chronological tri-partition of Indian history, based on the emerging British conception of history in the nineteenth century, along religious lines became a supplement to the myth of the golden age of the Vedas. Orientalism popularized the idea that the Indian civilization was *fundamentally* Aryan and Vedic. In this paradigm non-Aryan communities and traditions were portrayed as external influences or domestic infringements on the core Aryan civilization of India. In the Indian revivalist movements of the nineteenth century, and the mass nationalism of the early twentieth century, these orientalist ideas became essential to the *historicization* of the Indian consciousness and the long term colonization of the Indian mind.

These ideas gathered steam during the nineteenth century and became the ideological base of *both* nationalism and communalism in India. The popularity of these ideas among the Indian middle class came from the education which produced this class in the first place. As is well known, colonial pedagogy developed in India under Utilitarian-Whiggish influence had two aims. First, to paraphrase Macaulay, it was designed to create a class of Indians who would be Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, opinions, morals and intellect. This class would be politically subordinate and culturally inferior to the British. Second, India was to be assigned a low place on the worldwide scale of national and *moral* progress. This justified British stewardship of India as progressive and providential – an important assumption of Whig history shared by the English educated Indian moderates. The overall intention was to inculcate a sense of racial, cultural, religious and historical inferiority among Indian middle class by helping it recreate its national past in degrading terms dictated by the foreign rulers.

The historical memory of the colonized was corrupted, possibly, beyond repair. Due to this institutionally designed *racial and cultural* inferiority the natives would forever remain in awe of the White man and painfully search for the causes of their historical decline. Disciplining the mind of the colonial subject was central to this project. Towards this end the tri-partition of Indian history along Eurocentric lines, the notion of a dark age under Muslim rule and the hope that India would make progress under enlightened modern British rule became the milestones of Indian historiography. The idea that British rule would, for good or bad, effect a revolution in a stagnant civilization was dear to almost all the intellectuals in Europe including Karl Marx. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, therefore, the West became a trans-historical reference point in the construction of India's past, present and *future*. Since then, as Partha Chatterjee reminds us,

a "cultural essentialism has been germane to the very way in which the sciences of society have developed in the West"[26]. The last sixty years, which include the period of India's descent into the economic quagmire of neo-liberalism, have shown that the dominant discourses of Indian society have scarcely tried to counter this European, and now American, cultural essentialism.

The pedagogy of the oppressor produced interesting political results. Orientalist and Whig history influenced the views of even those middle class Indians who became nationalists from the late nineteenth century. Even as the moderate faith in British rule yielded to opposition and conflict in the twentieth century, the core tenets of colonial historiography were reproduced in the growing nationalist and communal historiography of India. Medieval conflicts were transformed into modern communal conflicts and the eighteenth century became a pitiable episode of Indian history characterized by 'Muslim' decadence. On the other hand, even the revivalist movements of the nineteenth century like the Arya Samaj could not escape the influence of colonial modernity. While the *Satyarthaprakash* glorified the Vedic age and debunked Brahmanism, Islam and Christianity, the schools and colleges set up by the moderate section of the Arya Samaj were, significantly enough, called the Dayananda Anglo-Vedic (DAV) institutions[27]. Reformers, beginning with Rammohan Roy in the early nineteenth century, had grasped the importance of combining western learning and Indian culture to develop an Indian modernity. Following the Revolt of 1857, and the subsequent punishment meted out to the north Indian Muslims by the triumphant British, Muslim reformers also began to highlight the importance of imbibing Western learning. Consequently British influence remained strong in institutions like the Aligarh Muslim Univeristy (AMU) set up by Muslim reformers desirous of combining Islamic and Western-modernist elements in a futuristic education system tailor made for Muslims. By the end of the nineteenth century Orientalism, Indology and Whig history had converged to form a broad colonial episteme which conditioned the minds of colonial subjects chaffing against the cultural inferiority induced in their life by foreign subjugation. In these circumstances nationalism appeared as the most potent form of *historical redemption* for the colonized native elite.

V

Colonialism dominated India at two levels. The first was the British domination and control of the Indian society and economy. This was accomplished with politics, finance, race, military superiority and, above all, westernized education. Ultimately the longevity of the British project in India was assured by colonizing the Indian mind. The second domination was attempted by the psychologically colonized Indian middle class over the Indian masses in the name of national communities which were imagined with the help of historical categories derived from colonial education. In the long run the failure of the Indian middle class to decolonize its mind led to the partition of India along communal lines and the foisting of a pseudo - westernized modernity on a largely pre-modern country. Following this, it may be argued, the resilient colonization of the Indian mind achieved by British colonialism has helped open the door to

the *globalized* neocolonial realities unfolding in India today. The colonized subject's imagination of his/her history which underlines his/her deep sense of cultural and racial inferiority produces the milieu in which the material culture of globalization thrives. Sometimes this inferiority produces, as in the case of psychologically unstable persons, a superiority complex like nationalism and chauvinism in various colors *a la Adler*.

Orientalism and Whig history, *as complementary parts of a Western historical discourse*, produced a worldview suited to the British rulers of India and the Indian middle class produced by them. This worldview was *derived* from modern western knowledge whose claim to universal relevance was rarely challenged by the Indian elite. This *discourse* underlined both the support the colonial state received from the Indian elite hopeful of modernization under British rule *and* the opposition it inspired among sections of the Indian elite who blamed the economics of colonialism for Indian backwardness. The moderate idea of *un-British rule in India* was based on an idealization of nineteenth century industrially developed Britain – the occidental opposite of the orient. As colonialism unfolded in India the opposition to, and support for, colonial rule in Indian society emanated from a shared historical epistemology to which Eurocentric ideas and modern comparative history remained central. The culture and tradition with which the Indian elites wanted to confront the materialism of the West came, foremost, from the knowledge of oriental cultures produced by colonial knowledge itself[28]. This knowledge enabled the Indian elites to imagine politico-cultural communities in the colonial context with highlighted postcolonial possibilities – they had to ape the west to reform their societies and oppose the west simultaneously but they remained organically based in a society where long term continuities prevailed.

The new knowledge of historical time, to which notions of glorious historical periods, subsequent decline, current backwardness and future resurgence were crucial, played the most important role in the construction of social identities and community politics in colonial India. Colonial knowledge gave the leaders of Indian castes, communities and the rising middle class the tools for imagining and fashioning communities and *nationalisms* based on their peculiar understanding of culture and history. Thus nationalism and communalism - two forms of modern nationalism - were produced by the political and pedagogical context created in India by British colonialism. On the other hand, Indian opposition to colonialism failed to transcend the framework of historical progress provided by the liberal-positivist interpretations of history. The opponents of colonial rule could have achieved a revolutionary critique of colonialism only by generating a historical knowledge *outside* the colonizing trappings of modern historiography which conditioned their worldview in the first place. Alternative *vernacular* forms of knowing and practicing life survived outside the institutional framework of colonialism. But these were exiled from the intellectual universe of the colonial Indian bourgeoisie because of its pretensions of being the harbinger of modernity in a stagnant civilization. Finally, Indian middle class hope in the apotheosis of post colonial modernity turned it decisively away from the possibility of finding an alternative to industrial capitalism.

During the colonial period the opposition to colonialism was seen to distinguish *secular* nationalism from *religious* communalism. After 1947 imperialism and colonialism were not considered the main enemies of the nation. New national enemies were quickly found in Pakistan and China. In India today the difference between nationalism and communalism – as ideologies of the ruling elite - appears much reduced not only because of elite political pragmatism but also because of the shared historical premises of these two *nationalisms*. There is reason to believe that since secular and religious nationalisms in India are essentially the products of colonial modernity they have much in common. Hindutva's belief in its future is based on a re-discovery of India's pre-Islamic past as an inspiration necessary to modernize an ageing nation desperate for a strong leader who can help raise India to super-power status. History shows that such dreams often turn into nightmares. The lasting importance of Orientalism and Whig history in the largely 'mainstream' historical viewpoint of the urban, culturally dominant, articulate and politically influential corporate sections of the great Indian middle class can only be explained with reference to the colonization of the Indian mind achieved by British colonialism. Hindu nationalism lurks under the Western veneer of this class. At the same time, an Islamism produced by the economic and cultural impact of Western imperialism and extremist Zionism on North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia has created fertile grounds for the continuous reproduction of historical stereotypes discussed in this paper. Truly, the history of politics and the politics of history go hand in hand.

Notes

1. Comments on the first draft by Professor Amiya Prosad Sen are gratefully acknowledged. A second draft, presented at the Indian History Congress [Contemporary India Section], Patiala, in December 2012, met with an enthusiastic response from all those present including Mr. N. Ram the Sectional President and Editor in Chief, *The Hindu*.
2. *The History of British India*, Associated Publishing House, New Delhi, 1972, Volume I, 24.
3. *The End of the Peace Process*, [Revised] Penguin, New Delhi, 2002 , 56.
4. For more on these issues see Karl E Meyer, *The Dust of Empire: The Race for Mastery of the Asian Heartland* , Perseus Books, 2003; John Perkins, *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man: The shocking inside story of how America really took over the world*, Ebury Press, 2005 &. *The Secret History of the AmericanEmpire: Economic Hit Men, Jackals & the Truth about Global Corruption*, Penguin*, 2007;* Donny Gluckstein, *A People's History of the Second World War: Resistance versus Empire*, Pluto Press, London, 2012 and Anirudh Deshpande, '*One step forward two steps backward: a historical critique of twentieth century decolonization'* The *Inclusive*, (online) December, 2012.
5. I have borrowed the term from the works of John Perkins. It means a collusion of the interests of the corporate capitalists, the banks and media they own and control and the state they successfully corrupt.

6. Romila Thapar, *The Past and Prejudice*, National Book Trust of India, New Delhi, 1993, 4.

7. Romila Thapar , 'The Future of the Indian Past', in *Re-Imagining India and other essays*, Orient BlackSwan, New Delhi, 2011, 158-189.

8. The rise of politicians like Narendra Modi, and his great popularity in the Hindu sections of the Indian middle class, must be assessed in this context. At the same time the call for a charismatic leader who, it is being assumed in sections of the Indian bourgeoisie and media, will lead India to prosperity and greatness emanates from the psychological need for a saviour created by the current intractable economic crisis in India created by two decades of reckless globalization. The supporters of a corporate backed development dictatorship refuse to examine the historical causes of India's failed globalization experiment for obvious reasons.

9. To illustrate this I reproduce an extract from a conversation with friends which took place in the recent past: "*We recently visited the Jama Masjid area in the walled city by the Metro. The Mughlai food at Nizam's was mouth watering but we felt scared in the Jama Masjid. Everyone there looked like a terrorist and we felt very insecure. In contrast, how peaceful and secure the atmosphere in our temples is!*". Bollywood's response to such insinuations does little to help matters: *My name is Khan and I am not a terrorist* the hero (Shah Rukh Khan) declares in *My Name is Khan* which showcases an autistic US citizen of Indian Muslim origin trying to convince the US President that Muslims are not terrorists. The film shifts the onus of exoneration to the Muslim community.

10. Michael Gottlob (ed.), *Historical Thinking in South Asia: A Handbook of Sources from Colonial Times to the Present*, OUP, New Delhi, 2006, 1.

11. For example see his widely read, *History of England from the Accession of James II* [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whig_history, 11 October, 2009].

12. A competent study of the evolution of historical thinking in South Asia is provided in Michael Gottlob (ed.), *Historical Thinking in South Asia: A Handbook of Sources from Colonial Times to the Present*, OUP, New Delhi, 2006.

13. Three good examples of looking at the relationship of communal memory and historiography are: Sumit Guha, 'Speaking Historically: The Changing Voices of Historical Narration in Western India, 1400-1900', *The American Historical Review*, Vol.109, No.4, October 2004 & 'The Frontiers of Memory: What the Marathas Remembered of Vijayanagara', *Modern Asian Studies* 43, 1 (2009) 269-288 [First published online 8 January, 2008] and Prachi Deshpande, *Creative Pasts:Historical Memory and Identity in Western India 1700-1960*, Permanent Black, New Delhi, 2007. For a critique of historiography see Munslow, *Deconstructing History* Second Edition, Routledge, 2008; see G. Aloysius, *Nationalism without a Nation in India*, OUP, 1997, for

a critique of Indian nationalism. According to Aloysius nationalism represents the "forces of domination" compared with the forces of "resistance" represented by the nation.

14. *Historical Thinking in South Asia*, 21.

15. 'A Few Words about the History of Bengal' (1882-3) in *Historical Thinking in South Asia*, 142.

16. Umair Ahmed Muhajir, 'Liminality: A Manifesto', *Economic and Political Weekly*, January 16, 2010, pp.27-29.

17. The emergence of colonial ideologies in India has been examined primarily in relation to the perceived difference and similarities between the British and Indians in Thomas R. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj*, CUP, New Delhi, 1995.

18. For more on this see Eric Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India*, OUP, Delhi, 27-79.

19. For details see Georg G. Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century – From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*, Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, 2005, pp.31-35 and Eileen Ka-May Cheng, *Historiography An Introductory Guide*, Continuum, London and New York, 2012, pp. 39-60.

20. Gijs Kruitzer, *Xenophobia in Seventeenth Century India*, Leiden University Press, 2009 [Low resolution acrobat PDF document accessed and downloaded on 12/12/2009] revisits the role of Indian elites in informing European perceptions of Indian communities in the medieval Deccan. Kruitzer asserts the existence of well defined, and often antagonistic, caste and religious identities in pre-colonial India in an attempt to better understand the prehistory of communal conflicts *and* undermine the post-modernist submissions on the subject. However the fact that strong, well defined, social identities flourished in pre-colonial India has not only been well known for a long time but does *not* refute both the postmodernist and Marxist positions according to which colonialism did not create social identities in India but reinvented and politicized them in consonance with colonial needs. For more on this see my*Marathas, Rajputs and Afghans in mid eighteenth century India:Bhausahebanchi Bakhar and the articulation of cultural difference in pre-colonial India*[NMML Occasional Paper, 2013]. Further, and this is something scholarship focused on 'communities' does not generally take into account, the Indian middle classes were also produced by the colonial system. This had a profound impact on how social identities were perceived in colonial and postcolonial India. This is discussed in my *Class, Power and Consciousness in Indian Cinema and Television*, Primus Books, New Delhi, 2009.

21. Said*, Orientalism*, Penguin Books, 1995, 25, puts the long term danger of Orientalism in the following words: "My hope is to illustrate the formidable structure of cultural domination and, specifically for formerly colonized peoples, the dangers and temptations of employing this structure upon themselves or upon others."

22. Said's enormous range of ideas on the problems of the contemporary world can be found in *The End of the Peace Process*, [Revised] Penguin, New Delhi, 2002.

23. Braj Ranjan Mani, *Debrahmanising History – Dominance and resistance in India Society*, Manohar, 2005, 189 - 190. Mani qualifies Said's thesis by asserting that "It is axiomatic that no external power can establish an enduring domination over a conquered people except with the latter's tacit toleration or active support, and the colonial conquest of India was no exception to this."

24. 'Liminality: A Manifesto', *Economic and Political Weekly*, p. 29.

25. *Aryans, Jews Brahmins: Theorizing Authority Through Myths of Identity* , Navayana, New Delhi, 2015.

26. *Nationalist thought and the Colonial World – A Derivative Discourse*, Zed Books, London, 1993, p.14.

27. See the *Satyarthprakash* on *www.aryasamajjamnagar.org*.

28. M.K. Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj*, 1909, is a good example of this. At the end of the text appear several quotations from European scholars extolling the self-sufficient village economy of India. Rural living was seen as an antidote to the ills of industrial capitalism by almost all romantic intellectuals in the nineteenth century.

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A Country of Love Jihads and Honour Killings: Analysing Perceptions of Indian Adults on Inter-Religious Marriages

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Abstract

The paper presents data gathered from a mini survey conducted with the aim of capturing popular perception of adults across different age groups on inter religious marriages. The study holds relevance in the context of events in the past decade that have shown resistance to inter-caste and inter-religious marriages, particularly in the northern states of India. Phenomena such as 'Honour killings' and 'love jehads' have brought to light the place of religion in everyday life and people's opinions about inter-religious marriages. It is in this context that the study aims to explore how perceptions towards religion and inter-religious marriages interact with variables of religion, gender, age, education, and social class. The paper concludes with the significant findings of the study and a brief discussion on what meaning these issues hold for education.

Religion is of particular relevance in the Indian context. This is most evident through the number of places of worship and the number of religious festivals celebrated in India. At the same time, popular perceptions highlight the present generation shying away from religion. Incidents of violence and aggression that are rooted in religion are not far and wide. Indian history has shown evidence of communal and religious tension at the time of partition, Hindu Muslim riots of 1969 in Gujarat, 1984 Sikh riots, ethnic cleansing of Hindu Kashmiris in nineties, Babri Masjid controversy in 1992, and many other incidents of religious violence that probably do not make it to the news and are not studied.

Kakar(1995) elaboratedupon the psychology of violence. He highlightedthe involvement of the masses in religious violence. This may even be true when at a personal level they may not demonstrate strong support of violence. He further analysed the role of rumours in influencing the collective unconscious of communities and creating inter-community resistance. Kakar also emphasized that people in India are both religious and secular at the same time. He supports the view that people tend to maintain a secular public stance. In their personal lives, they may be intolerant of other religious practices and beliefs. This highlights the many layers and shades that religion takes in India.[1]

Along with Kakar, Varma (2005) has written about the extent to which religion seeps into the lives of middle class families. Eating habits, dressing sense, belief system, and even names can have religious overtones.[2]

The past few years have also seen many cases of opposition of inter-caste and inter-religious marriages, particularly in northern states of India. Print and electronic media has highlighted vehement opposition faced by young adults choosing to marry outside of their religion.[3] Opposition varies from refusal by parents to accept the relationship, verbal and physical abuse by members of the family and community, and at times, social isolation of the entire family by the community. The ordeal often does not end even when the decision making adults are able to marry each other. There have been reports of the couple being tormented mentally and tortured physically. Some of these incidences have also results in family members killing the young adults in question, who may be their own sons or daughters, brothers or sisters. They justify their actions on grounds of maintaining the family honour and have termed these as 'honour killings'.

Honour killings is not a phenomenon unique to India. The world over honour killings have been undertaken whenever young adults have attempted to transcend traditional boundaries in choosing who to marry. Most of the instances that have been reported have been of those marrying outside of their religion or caste. However, in some countries, there are also cases reported of honour killings in the case of homosexual marriages.

Around the same time, in the year 2009, a somewhat similar idea arose through the phenomenon termed as 'love jihad' or 'Romeo jihad'. According to this concept, Muslim men supposedly target young girls from non-Muslim communities to marry them and convert to Islam. Although this concept arose in southern states of India, in the past five years, it is considered to have spread across the country into northern states, and across the border into Pakistan and even United Kingdom.

A common insight that can be derived from both the concepts is that inter-religious and inter-caste marriages have little acceptance in society. Studies by Donner (2002) and Narayan (2003) are significant here. Donner emphasised that the wider social and political order exerts influence on the notion of marriage in India. The research highlighted the influence of notions of what are considered desirable and undesirable marriages. Such notions influencesocial relations that couples in marriages developed. Further, they exert influence on the development of group identities. The study explored that love marriages tend to challenge parental authority, particularly in cases where a match takes place across *jati*. These have more pronounced differences in dress codes, religious practices, and everyday eating habits.

Based in Bengali middle class households, Donner's study provides evidence to the acceptance of marriages between well educated and middle class Bengali Hindus and South Indian Christians. The most disparate form of marriage across *jatis*, is that between Hindus and Muslims. "Muslim, even though, Bengali speaking, is the 'archetypal other'- described as 'overtly aggressive and masculine'- is constructed and interpreted in relation with frequent incidents of communal violence... A Hindu family is highly unlikely to accept a Muslim daughter-in-law, who would prepare meals, maintain domestic rituals or take care of her elderly in-laws under normal circumstances... Whereas this may be less difficult in the opposite case (where conversion may

take care of concerns about ritual purity), where a daughter who marries into the 'other' community is seen as 'lost' in both cases".[4]

Narayan elaborated on the reasons for the lack of acceptance of inter-religious marriages in India. She states that "both the family and the larger society negatively sanction marriages of persons with mixed religious background. Intermarriage signals a sharp break Intermarriage signals a sharp break from the past. In spite of India being a nation with a highly diverse population, most personal prejudices and social sanctions lend control to enforcement of endogamous unions".[5]

Incidents reported in newspapers are often from rural areas in India. Several significant questions emerge from these trends- Is the resistance to inter-religious/caste marriages only restricted to rural India? Does the educational background of the individual influence his or her opinion about inter-religious marriages? How do factors of gender and age influence perceptions about inter-religious marriages? Are perceptions also influenced by socio-economic background?

An open ended questionnaire was developed to address these questions.[6] The objectives of the questionnaire were to develop insights about various aspects of inter-religious marriages and to gauge the general perceptions of society about marriages between different religions. The questionnaire consisted of fifteen multiple choice questions. The nature of questions varied from fact based questions to those requiring opinionated responses, and to those requiring situation based responses. The questionnaire was deliberately kept brief and simple to ensure that a large group of respondents provide answers to all the questions. Apart from a few questions on biographical details (age, sex, religion, and education), the questionnaire explored several themes on religion and inter-religious marriages. Some of the themes were perceptions and reactions towards different religions and people in inter-religious marriages, social reactions to inter-religious marriages, perceived issues of conflict in and chances of success of inter-religious marriages, and an individual's role in communal conflict.

The questionnaire was responded to by two hundred and seventy two (272) respondents in the age group of eighteen to sixty five (18-65) years, in Delhi. It was circulated both personally as well as through the internet.[7] It was personally administered to respondents who were uncomfortable with reading English or those who were unschooled. Young adult respondents were contacted through educational institutions and the questionnaire was administered in a group. They were further asked to share hard or soft copies of the questionnaire with their peers and family members. To tap the older population, college professors, their family members, as well as residents of a neighbourhood with a predominantly middle socio-economic background were contacted. The questionnaire was personally administered to the lower socio-economic group. Respondents in this group included blue collared workers, domestic helps, street vendors and rickshaw pullers drawn from different neighbourhoods in Delhi. Prior consent from all the respondents was sought for participation in the study.

The maximum number of respondents (150) was from the age group of eighteen to thirty (18-30) years. Care was taken to ensure that adequate representation of all age groups was maintained. Heterogeneity across gender and social class was also maintained. Forty five percent (45 per cent) of the respondents were men. Fifty (50) respondents were from the lower socio-economic class.

Profile of the Respondents

The final sample consisted of 272 participants. Of these, 52 participants were from the 40-65 years age group, 20 from the 18-21 years age group and the 31-35 years age group each. A vast majority of the sample, 130 participants were between the 21-30 years of age. About 50 participants from the lower socio-economic class were also interviewed. 45 per cent of the participants were men. More than half the participants (143) were post graduates. About 55 participants had not completed their schooling. A little over 75 per cent of the participants were Hindus, about 15 per cent, Muslims, and 4 per cent each Sikhs and Christians. 4 per cent of the participants chose not to declare their religion and wrote descriptions such as non-believer, atheist or agnostic.It would be worthwhile to reiterate here that the purpose of this task was to know the popular views that existed about inter-religious marriages. The analysis of the questionnaire was, thus, done to arrive at this understanding.

Analysis of Responses

One third of the participants believed that religion provides faith and builds character. While 25 per cent believe that it teaches tolerance and justice, an equal number believe that it creates hierarchical divisions in society. While about 35 per cent people across all age groups have shown willingness to work with and befriend people from other religions, less than 20 per centare willing to marry or engage in close relationships with people from another religion. The numbers are similar when people were asked their opinion about relationships that their children engage in. In the 40-65 years age group, the number of people willing to accept their children in inter-religious marriages was slightly higher (about 25 per cent).

Although most respondents were not willing to get into inter-religious marriage themselves, a vast majority (73 per cent) believe that those in an inter-religious marriage are exercising their free choice. 7 per cent also believed that they were going against the community and 3 per cent believed that they were committing a sin. Most of these 10 per cent were married men, in the 27-30 years age group. Half of them were post graduates.

Most (42 per cent) believed that non acceptance by family and community is the main reason for disagreements in an inter-religious marriage. A large number of participants also believed that religious beliefs and practices and personal habits such as food, clothing etc. are also reasons for disagreements. Only 10 per cent believed that raising children could be a point of disagreement. Another 10 per cent believed that disagreements in marriages were due to personal reasons which had nothing to do with religion.

Almost half the participants were of the opinion that all inter-religious marriages have an equal chance of lasting as marriages within the same religion. About 80 participants also felt that a Hindu-Sikh marriage had the maximum chance of lasting in comparison to other inter-religious marriages on account of similarity of religious beliefs and practices. Only 4 participants felt that a Muslim-Hindu marriage could last owing to factors related to the social history of communal conflict between these two religions in particular. In the lower socio-economic class, most of the participants felt that an inter-religious marriage with a Christian could not last and all the other marriages had equal chance. The reason specified for the same was that they felt most alienated from Christianity and felt a sense of oneness with people of all other religions. (*"Bakisabko to humnebachpan se dekha hi hai. Unkesathkhelebhihain. ChaheMussalmanhoyakuchbhi. Sikh, Jain to Hindu hi hai. Par Christian to alaghotehain. Unka khan paan, bhagwanbhialag hi hotahai. Woh God komaantehain."*)

60 per cent of the participants believed that if there was family acceptance, it increased the chances of success of an inter-religious marriage. Similarity of beliefs and practices in religions was supported by 10 per cent of the participants. About 30 participants were of the opinion that the success of the marriage depended on the understanding between the two individuals. This view was echoed by all the 50 participants in the lower socio-economic class. They believed that once the two were married, it was upto them to arrive at a mutual understanding. Family and the larger community do not matter much then, as they would have to leave their native place anyways. (*"Ghar, gaon to unhechhodna hi padega. Wahan to koi nahirehnedegaunko. Phirdonopehai. Ekko to apnadharmchhodna hi hoga. Nahin to kaisehoga. Ekbhichhod de to donophirraazikhushirehlenge."*)

A little less than 100 participants believed that children in an inter-religious marriage would grow up with a greater sense of freedom. As many as 36 per cent felt that there would not be much difference in an inter-religious family in comparison to other families. The respondents from the lower socio-economic class said that children can be raised well if one of the two gives up on their religion. If both stick to their religion then the children would not know who to believe in and what practices to follow. This would result in a greater sense of confusion. They also said that this usually does not happen as usually the girl gives up her religion.

Over 50 per cent of the participants believed that pressure is created on both the boy and the girl in an inter-religious marriage. However, in the lower socio-economic class, participants specified that the pressure on the girl is only for a short time. It is the man who has to go out and work and therefore has to face greater consequences of going against the community.

About 35 participants said that by getting into an inter-religious marriage automatically means that the couple is renouncing their religion even if they were not converting. Most of the participants, (more than 75 per cent) also believed that conversion would not be a problem in the marriage. In the lower socio-economic class, participants said that for an inter-religious marriage, conversion became essential, otherwise, the community would not let them marry. They also felt that greater

problems were likely to be faced if the girl did not convert to the religion. ("*Ladkiyonkeliyeaasanhaidharamchhodna. Usne to gharpe hi rehnahai. Waisechahejomarzikare. Par ladkeko to biradarikibatensunanipadengi. Isliyewohnahichhodsakta. Haan, woh agar jakebolegakiladkibhiapnedharamkihogayihai to biradari wale apneaapdheeredheerechuphojayenge.*")

Conclusion

The results of the survey reveal that religion is neither perceived as a wholly personal nor as a wholly social phenomenon. While most people believed that individual and family opinion were most important in taking a decision regarding an inter-religious marriage, they also seemed to believe that the larger community had an influential role in the formation of individual and familial opinions. Most did not find inter-religious marriages wrong in themselves. However, under the influence of the larger community, they showed unwillingness towards the same. The influence of the larger community was also felt more prominently in the rural context than in the urban context. This was especially highlighted by the participants in the lower socio-economic group ("*Dillimeinaakekaunpuchhtahai tum kyakarrahe ho.*").

Participants across all classes also felt that inter religious marriages were mostly a phenomenon of the upper socio-economic class. They looked at celebrities and their marriages as largely accepted because they belonged to a class which was away from the influence of the larger community. Further, in the lower socio-economic class, it had to be explained several times that inter-religious marriage is distinct from inter-caste and community marriages. Nevertheless, they saw inter-religious marriages posing the same problems as were posed by inter-caste marriages. One participant said that inter-religious marriage can be accepted but an inter-caste marriage will not be accepted by the community.

The questionnaire largely revealed that the perceptions of people varied across socio-economic classes. However, no distinctions were visible across gender and age within the socio-economic classes.

Some of the significant insights that emerged were as follows:

Heterogeneity in responses was observed across socio-economic class. The views of respondents from the lower socio-economic class differed vastly from those in the higher socio-economic classes. For instance, respondents from the lower class were of the view that marriages between Hindus and Muslims were more likely to sustain and gain acceptance from society than those between Hindus and Christians. The reason given in support of this was that the Hindus and Muslims grew up in the same villages whereas the Christians were outsiders in the society. In contrast, respondents from the upper class believed that a Hindu-Christian marriage was less likely to face conflict than a Hindu-Muslim marriage since it would be coloured by the history of communal conflict between the two communities in the country.

Respondents across socio-economic class felt that inter-faith and inter-sect marriages in India were quite common and were unlikely to face conflict and social opposition. Marriages between *Vaishnavites*(devotees of the Hindu God Vishnu) and *Saivites*(devotees of the Hindu God Shiva) were considered common. The same was considered true for other religions, particularly Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists.

Likewise, across socio-economic class, the view that emerged was that marriages between religions that were perceived to be similar were less likely to experience conflict. These included marriages between Hindus, Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists. Islam and Christianity were seen to be closer to each other. Marriages between Muslims and Christians, thus, were perceived to have higher chances of acceptance by the family and society.

No noteworthy difference on account of gender and age emerged within each socio-economic class.

Although it was evident that there were differences in opinions according to socio-economic class, it is important to note that there was no significant difference in opinions on account of educational background of participants. This raises significant questions for teachers and teacher educators in the role that education plays in the lives of students. Does and should education have a significant role to play in promoting tolerance and acceptance? Should education be seen as a socialisation agency that merely transmits to its students what are prevalent trends? Or should it be an agent of bringing about social change? More significantly, should educational processes provide opportunities to students to learn to think for themselves and take decisions that may be in contravention of dogmatic, societal norms? Perhaps, these are questions that teachers and teacher educators need to answer for themselves.

Notes

1. Sudhir Kakar, *The Colours of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion and Conflict, Viking Press, New Delhi*,1995.
2. Pawan Varma, *Being Indian*, Penguin, New Delhi, 2005.
3. "All for 'honour'". *Frontline*. 24(14). 14–27 July 2007.
   Amanda Hodge, (3 April 2010). "India at odds as caste culture turns to killing". <u>The Australian</u>.
   Vishal Joshi, (27 March 2010). "Haryana village boycotts honour killing victim's family, again". *Hindustan Times*.
   "Skeletons in the closet". *Hindustan Times*. August 3, 2013. Retrieved 2013-08-17.
   Corey Charlton, (20 November 2014). "New 'honour killing' murder shocks India after bride's father allegedly strangles her and burns the body days after marrying a man from the 'wrong' caste". *Mail Online*.

4. Henrihe Donner, *One's Own Marriage: Love Marriages in a Calcutta Neighbourhood* in *South Asia Research,* Vol. 22 No. 1, 2002, pp. 79-94.

5. AnjanaNarayan, *Home and the World: Inter-Religious Marriages in India*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the *American Sociological Association, Atlanta,* 2003,Retrieved from www.allacademic.com/meta/p107363_index.html

6. The study reported in this article was conducted as a scouting task for doctoral research work by the author in the Department of Education, University of Delhi.

7. The study was based in the National Capital Territory of Delhi for the purpose of personal administration of the questionnaire. Online responses were sought from people across the country. Online responses were therefore restricted to educated, English conversant respondents.

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The Armenian Genocide: Pope Benedict XV and Ottoman Relations

Syed Uddin-Ahmed

Abstract

Pope Benedict XV (Giacomo Paolo Giovanni Battista dellaChiesa) was the Pope at a time of major political upheaval in the world. His papacy covered from 1914-1922 which would entail major political chaos including the World War re-configuring the world system. In terms of ideology Europe was going through significant revolutionary change. He would become the Pope after two of the longest pontificates the Church had ever experienced so there was a desire for continued longevity in his election. His papacy, however, would be in the shadows of a major event--World War I--which would put him in an unenviable position of facing an increasingly hostile European political theater as the head of the Church.

If the Church ever needed a papacy that had strong diplomatic skills, then it was during the World War period in a changing global system. It would be his crafty diplomatic skills that would be the essence of how the Church managed to survive in a period of major political and ideological constraint especially, in the Church's desire to avoid real conflict with hostile European and external threats.

In this paper, I would like to address the following questions: What was his role in the fall of the Ottoman Empire? How was he relevant in the international relations field? What were his policies and its impact on the Ottoman Empire? What was the relationship of the Church under Benedict XV with the Ottoman Empire in a period of increasing international and political upheaval for the Church?

Pope Benedict XV (Giacomo Paolo Giovanni Battista della Chiesa) was pope at a time of major political upheaval in the world. His papacy ran from 1914-1922, a time which would encompass major moments of political chaos, including a World War which would reconfigure the entire world system. In terms of ideology, Europe at this time was going through significant revolutionary change. Benedict would become pope after two of the longest pontificates the Catholic Church had ever experienced, so there was a desire for continued longevity in his election. His papacy, however, would exist in the shadows of a major event - World War I - which would put him in the unenviable position of facing an increasingly hostile European political theater as the head of the Catholic Church. The ideological challenges in Europe were a real threat to the legitimacy of the Catholic Church. This was in addition to the challenges posed by Russia, as well as the external threat of the Ottoman Empire.

Under his guidance, the Catholic Church found itself self-navigating through murky waters in a climate of deep social and ideological change. The challenges of nationalism, liberalism, and volatile global order seriously crippled the Catholic Church's ability to negotiate its existence. Yet Benedict XV was able to use his sagacity and diplomacy not only to lead the Catholic Church but also to remain relevant in this hectic time period where the Church was being deeply impacted by the influence of the rising liberal states of Europe. If the Church ever needed a papacy that had strong diplomatic skills, then it was during this First World War period and the resulting changing global system. It would be his crafty diplomatic skills that would be the essence of how the Catholic Church managed to survive in this period of major political and ideological constraint, and the main reason the Church was able to avoid real conflict with hostile European and external threats.

In this project, I would like to address the following questions: What was Pope Benedict's role in the fall of the Ottoman Empire? How was he relevant to the international relations field? What were his policies and their impact on the Ottoman Empire? What was the relationship of the Church under Benedict XV to the Ottoman Empire in this period of increasing international and political upheaval?

The papacy of Benedict XV has often been overshadowed in history by the First World War. This was a conflict that threatened the survival and legitimacy of the Catholic Church. The previous reign of Pius X was that of a pastoral leader; he passed away right at the beginning of World War I. He was tremendously distressed by the conflicts of Europe; he was not, however, able to persuade or influence Europe to any sort of peace. In fairness, he was not known as a renowned diplomat; his strengths resided in his pastoral nature and traditional roots. We have to remember that not all popes wanted nor enjoyed engaging with the international arena.

According to Coppa, "Depressed by the descent into the abyss, some suspected that the conflict sapped Pius X's will to live and contributed to his death in 1914."[1]

His attempts to bring about peace through the traditional activities of prayer and appeals to Europeans to exercise restraint were to no avail. In the end, he felt it was all he could do, and the conflict took a toll on him. Be that as it may, when he was ill and about to pass away, the cardinals realized the need for the next pope to be one with training and experience in international affairs. The new pope must be diplomatic and lead the Church at a time of chaos and turmoil. The cardinals felt the need for an interventionist pope in the line of a Leo XIII, rather than a pastoral one.[2] The conclave met at the end of August with the intention of acting quickly to elect the next pope, one with the diplomatic skills to navigate the Church through turbulent times.

According to Coppa, "The cardinals on September 3 rd, 1914 selected the sixty-year-old Giacomo Giambattista Della Chiesa, Archbishop of Bologna, who had received invaluable diplomatic training at the College of Noble Ecclesiastics and had served a diplomatic internship under Leo XIII and Cardinal Rampolla."[3] He had the training and qualifications that the Church had been

searching for, and on the surface, they felt they had found the right man. This gives us insight into the day to day thinking of the Catholic Church which, instead of falling back via this move, was reconfiguring itself to deal the realities of an ever-changing world. His papacy would not be a long one; his reign lasted only from 1914 to 1922. Many people who were not from Rome did not even know about him. Yet he felt scathing criticism from all sides at the time of his selection.

Pollard goes on to state that "Giacomo Della Chiesa was not a well-known figure outside of his exile of Bologna, and had been a cardinal for only four months[;] it was really only during his pontificate that he was even known by people outside."[4] Clearly, there were people within the Catholic Church who did not recognize him and possibly did not feel he was the most qualified to be in that position. However, though he may not have been well known, this does not take away from his illustrious background. This background, for example, included being able to speak many different languages.

According to Coppa, "From the beginning of his pontificate Benedict, who was fluent in French, German, and Spanish as well as his native Italian, confronted the plague of war, and contrived to restore the peace."[5] The pope hit the ground running, and he took a very calculated and balanced approach. He knew the cost of overplaying his cards and did not want to endanger the Church.

However, he also took certain measures at least to alleviate the suffering of people when he could, even if he could not directly impact or stop the war. What he felt like he could do as the head of the Catholic Church was to curry some influence over what happened to people of the Catholic faith. He felt that he had a moral obligation to help people by alleviating their suffering.

For Benedict XV, the best and most impactful thing to do was to promote peace and engage heavily in humanitarian activities because, morally and politically, this was something a pope could do and face relatively little criticism. Even if the conflict were to go on, the Church could make its presence felt and hold the moral high road by actively helping affected communities. According to Pollard, "He attracted hostility from both sides as a result of his efforts to end the World War, [and] gratitude from some of the many people, military, and civilian who were helped by his humanitarian activities.[6] Beyond this contribution, Pollard felt that Benedict was more or less a footnote in history that had been forgotten by the time of the Second World War, primarily because he suffered the misfortune of being a war pope.

Furthermore, he believed that it was the shortness of his reign and the backdrop of the war that made Benedict fall into obscurity. Also, from his intriguing analysis, we gain a greater appreciation of a pontificate that deserves more attention due to the dynamic challenges he faced in his time. Pollard states, "beyond liberalism and nationalism [,] the pope had to deal with problems of socialism and fascism."[7] The challenges were real, but because of his savvy in diplomacy, he dealt with these challenges very smartly, never bringing the Church into any direct conflict. His true strength was mediation, and he should be remembered as a pope who worked passionately to promote peace in a time when the Catholic Church faced dramatic challenges.

Pollard stated that his "Peace Note of 1917 in which he proposed warring parties bring to cessation all conflict was one of the only things that he was ever known for."[8] The main emphasis of Pope Benedict's papacy was to promote and engage in peace-seeking activities. One of the reasons he may now be forgotten is that wars tend to be over-accommodated in history, and presented as monoliths. From Pollard's analysis, we can see that a common person, even at a time of declining Church influence, could work to at least limit conflict at some level.

Moreover, Pollard stated that "Benedict's pontificate was dedicated to the pursuit of peace, as he saw it, peace among the nations of Europe, peace in a human society torn by class conflict and ideological clashes, and peace in the Church after the excesses of the anti-modern policies of his predecessor Pius X."[9] He moved the Church into a position of non-antagonism, whether with relationships inside the Catholic Church or with outsiders such as European leaders or even in delicate relations with rivals from The Ottoman Empire.

He used a platform of pursuing peace as a way to protest the war and resist conflicts, in order to protect the Catholic Church from dangerous entanglements. According to Coppa, "In his view, the murderous struggle was prompted by four maladies: 1. The absence of mutual love, 2. Contempt for authority, 3. Class strife, and finally, 4. The unquenchable thirst for materials objects."[10] He was smart in his ability to negotiate relationships without coming into direct conflict. He was magnificent in his ability to avoid the question of who was at fault for the war and felt his energy would be better served towards achieving peace. As the head of the Catholic Church, the pursuit of peace gave him a voice in the international arena, yet he had to avoid offending or antagonizing anyone who could create hardships for Church followers. According to Coppa, "Benedict had his secretary of state open negotiations for a truce on Christmas, calling upon all the belligerents to suspend hostilities as an act of Christian faith and piety."[11]

The Catholic Church may have been in decline, but this did not mean that with the right leadership it would cease to remain relevant; his actions were an effort to keep the Church active, engaged, and relevant in the international arena. Even with his relationships with the Ottoman Empire, he never used strong language and always was cognizant of the well-being of Christians in foreign lands.

This is where we begin to see that beyond managing his duties as a pastoral leader, the pope managed foreign relations with a great level of sagacity. He took a very diplomatic approach towards not only European powers and the Russians, but also in his treatment of the Ottomans which was in particular very well crafted and skillful. He did not commit to any policies that could potentially harm or injure the significant Christian populations under direct Ottoman rule. We must remember that even if the Empire was in decline at the time of Benedict XV, it still yielded power over the region. The Ottoman Empire was beginning to experience significant political and social changes even within the Muslim communities; also, the Christian communities were no longer as restricted in their movements. However, it was the best alternative for the time.

According to Hourani, "The Ottoman system rested on a certain distribution of social power and a system of received ideas. Implicit in its structure: first, the political supremacy of Moslems over Christians; secondly, the existence of an Islamic orthodoxy of which the Sultan was defender; and thirdly, the primacy of religious over ethnic or other loyalties."[12] The Ottoman government was beginning to face difficulties and, similar to the papacy, the power of the Sultan was compromised due to changing global dynamics. In many ways, like the pope, the Sultan was also dealing with the realities of a changing political climate in which the great age of the Ottoman rule had come to an end.

There had already been rebellions and agitation from communities who in a previous era had accepted the dominance of the Ottoman Sultan. The stability and economic benefits of the old empire had begun to fade. Christian communities were growing more prosperous and less easily dominated under the old Ottoman system of the "Dhimmis," a reference to non-Muslim communities who paid a tax in exchange for the protection of the state.[13] Christian communities began to become cognizant of the ever-weakening Ottoman state and its inability to control the Empire as it once had.

According to Hourani, "The decline in Ottoman strength coincided with an increase in the prosperity and inner strength of certain Christian communities and the old domination became more difficult to bear or less advantageous."[14] In particular, the Jews, Greeks, and then the Armenians became more emboldened in their economic and political activities. The Christian communities felt the loosening of the grip of the Ottoman State. The once-minority communities were no longer so easily shackled. These were truly interesting developments in Asia Minor; the minority communities were beginning to act independently of the Ottoman State, even before the fall of the Empire after the First World War.

Furthermore, there was a greater movement of the minority Christian communities into places in Europe such as Italy. The Christian communities were increasingly prosperous and showed a greater level of upward mobility, even as early as the end of the 18 th Century. For example, the Armenians were able to enjoy serious upward mobility because, according to Hourani, "First they [had] the influence of their bankers (sarrdf) on the provincial governors and therefore on the administration of the Empire, and their control of the traderoutes leading to Persia and Central Asia, and to some extent of trade with India."[15]

As the Armenians began to experience a cultural, social, economic, and spiritual renaissance in the Islamic realm, the Ottoman Empire fell into decline, especially with mysticism increasing in popularity and the challenges posed by the rising Wahhabism in the Hejaz (Mecca/Medina: Islamic holy lands). The Christians in Aleppo and the Mount Lebanon region were also increasing in prosperity and even were able to reconnect on some level with Europe and, in particular, with Rome in this period of decline. According to Makdisi, "The Ottoman State faced the perils of Modernity especially in Mount Lebanon with imposing Islamic superiority in the face of Modernism, instead of pursuing the policy of religious accommodation the state began to mimic

its own modern state-centric system (quasi-modernism) in what he referred as an Ottoman Orientalism."[16]

This only led to the European analysis of despotism. Makdisi stated in his critique of Ottoman Orientalism, "The reactionary actions of the Ottoman State conceded European superiority because the West was the home of progress and the East … the home of backwardness."[17] It's not that the Ottomans were immune to the changes around the world or the rapid influence of Europe, but rather that they were caught in a situation similar to that of the Catholic Church where they were reactionary in their actions. They were not what they once were because their influence or their ability to show themselves as competent and relevant players in the world theater was waning.

Pope Benedict XV played a role in the fall of the Ottomans in indirect ways that were of the diplomatic variety. He never challenged or antagonized the diminishing state. He did, however, take interest first in their actions against the Armenians in the genocide perpetrated by the Ottomans, and moreover he was very concerned about the collapse of the millet system of the Palestine Mandate because of how it might negatively impact the lives of many Christians in that region.

According to Tsimhoni, "The Ottoman government dealt with the dhimmis as members of a community rather than as individuals. A millet [was] headed by a millet- basis (a patriarch or a chief rabbi) who, in addition to his spiritual and ecclesiastical powers, was responsible to the state for the administration of his millet."[18] The British partition of Palestine was a frightening event that brought the unknown to these communities of minorities who had historically been protected during the Ottoman Empire, at least while it was strong. However, the changing geopolitical realities of the time had made the Empire weak.

Tsimhoni states: "From the early expansion of the empire, the Ottomans recognized three principal communities only as millets: the Greek Orthodox, the Armenian Orthodox, and the Jews."[19] This was the system under which the Ottomans ruled over the minority communities who, at least in terms of practice, were autonomous; the Ottoman State tried as much as possible to protect them from abuse and outside threats to their communities. Makdisi even went as far as to state that while that Ottoman Empire was strong, it managed "To allow a great deal of autonomy and freedom to the practicing dhimmi communities, in particular, The Catholics."[20]

The pope played a role in protecting the interests of these communities and knew that a change in power could potentially be harmful. The pope took a break from his usual stance of impartiality because the wellbeing of non-Muslims, especially Catholic Christians, was a major concern for him. This was due to his skepticism regarding British rule (in contrast to the more known and accepted millet system) which they more or less mimicked, with some hiccups along the way.However, it is in the situation of the Armenian genocide that we see a pope who really broke his vow of impartiality. The reason why he broke such a vow was very noble, and it truly illustrated his prowess as a humanitarian. According to Coppa, "The Pope had a moral obligation to denounce

violence and injustice, especially as the head of The Church whether they were in Europe or Abroad." The Armenian Genocide by the Ottoman State in 1915 was one of the most horrific episodes in human history, and once again highlighted the myriad of obstacles faced by the Church in this period.[21]

The pope was astonished and dismayed by the horrific program of genocide conducted by the Ottomans at this time. Some historians even consider this a holocaust event, showing the brutality of war and the dangerous sides of modernity and nationalism, where people were butchered under the guise of changing ideologies. Armenian Catholics began to embrace their religious and ethnic identity, giving birth to a form of nationalism, not unlike the Greeks who curried much favor with the Empire. However, they found themselves the odd man out when the Empire reacted violently towards this community trying to assert itself; it was then that the Ottomans became guilty of committing genocide. This retrenching and attempting to convert people, forcing a quasi-modernized state policy, is what lead to Makdisi's criticism. He called it an "Ottoman Orientalism," highlighting the backwardness of the East and the incompetence of the Empire.[22]

Pope Benedict got involved in this instance much more passionately than he has been given credit. According to Hourani, "The Pope attempted to get Germany and Austria–Hungary involved in protesting to its Turkish ally. The Pope himself sent a personal letter to the Sultan Mehmed V, who was also Caliph of Islam. It had no success, as over a million Armenians died, either killed outright by the Turks or as a result of maltreatment or from starvation."[23] There was no doubt that this was a systematic genocide and one of the most disgusting episodes in human history. Pope Benedict understood how to delicately balance his actions towards the Ottomans; he implored the Sultan, in his direct letter to Mehmed V, to show mercy and compassion to the innocent Armenians. He even made an appeal to the Sultan not to act against the will of his government and engage in practices beneath his status and stated that the Armenians were people of the book who were protected by the Ottoman State.

Truly, this highlighted one of the most dramatic episodes in history where a pope reached out to a foreign ruler, one who was not of his faith and implored him for the sake of humanity and God to cease to engage in activities that brought death and destruction to so many innocent people. Although he lacked an army or strong political force, what the actions of Pope Benedict did is highlight the important role he played in this genocide as a humanitarian. He could not force the Sultan to change his mind and deal with the realities of war, nationalism, liberalism, fascism, and socialism, but in his own unique way did his best to prevent even more people from dying.

Finally, Pope Benedict was a man who truly navigated the Catholic Church through a stressful and anxious period in Church history, even in his relationship with the Ottomans; much like other rivals in this war period, his stance was one of impartiality and he did not try to antagonize anyone. He did not, however, remain silent and instead stayed a dedicated defender of innocent Christians, in particular in the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Under him, the missionary activity of the Catholic Church flourished. He did his absolute best with the limited resources and opportunities he had, to

limit death and help as many people as possible. It may be that if he was pope in a different time or era, he might have been better remembered, but as Pollard stated, "His impartiality and humanitarian efforts deserve to be re-examined and appreciated."[24] While he may not have directly brought down the Ottoman Empire, even in the face of genocide he did engage them in dialogue and direct humanitarian assistance to do what it could to help prevent perhaps hundreds and thousands more people from dying.

Notes

1. Coppa, Frank J., The Papacy Confronts the Modern World, (Krieger Publishing Company, 2003), 40-42.
2. Ibid, 40-42.
3. Ibid, 40.
4. Pollard, John, The Unknown Pope: Benedict XV (1914-1922) and The Pursuit of Peace, (Bloomsbury Press, 2000), 5.
5. Coppa, Frank J., The Papacy Confronts the Modern World, (Krieger Publishing Company, 2003), 40-42.
6. Pollard, John, The Unknown Pope: Benedict XV (1914-1922) and The Pursuit of Peace, (Bloomsbury Press, 2000), 5.
7. Ibid, 25.
8. Ibid, 25-30.
9. Ibid, 25-30.
10. Coppa, Frank J., The Papacy Confronts the Modern World, (Krieger Publishing Company, 2003), 40-42.
11. Ibid, 40-42.
12. Hourani, Albert, "The Changing Face of the Fertile Crescent in the XVIIIth Century," Studia Islamica 8 (1957): 103.
13. Ibid, 103.
14. Ibid, 103.
15. Ibid, 103-105.
16. Makdisi, Ussama, "Ottoman Orientalism," The American Historical Review 107 (2002): 768-770.
17. Ibid, 768-770.

18. Tsimhoni, Daphne, "The Status of the Arab Christians under the British Mandate in Palestine," Middle Eastern Studies 20 (1984): 166-170.

19. Ibid, 167.

20. Makdisi, Ussama, "Ottoman Orientalism," The American Historical Review 107 (2002): 770-772.

21. Coppa, Frank J., The Papacy Confronts the Modern World, (Krieger Publishing Company, 2003), 40-42.

22. Makdisi, Ussama, "Ottoman Orientalism," The American Historical Review 107 (2002): 773-775.

23. Hourani, Albert, "The Changing Face of the Fertile Crescent in the XVIIIth Century," Studia Islamica 8 (1957): 110-112.

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Perspective Section

Imagining a Left Alternative in India

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Abstract

The political space in India is increasingly becoming mature in the sense that the contemporary electoral verdicts reflect at one extreme enthusiasm for new politics (AAP, Tinamul Congress) and at the other an acceptance of a political programme of narrow nationalism (BJP). Important to notice is the fact that historically rooted political parties like the Congress and the Left is experiencing a downslide in electoral space. Indian National Congress presently lacks leadership, programme and effective ideology to return to the centre stage. Moreover the new politics based parties are also beset with tendencies of the old. The present paper focuses on the Left political parties and imagines a roadmap for an alternative in Indian politics in near future.

Introduction

"*Kolaholtoh baron holo, ebar katha kanekane,
akhon hobe praner alap, kebolmatro ganegane …*"
Rabindranath Tagore

(With the ban on noises, it's time for whispers, to strike chord in hearts, only through songs…)

The present period in Indian politics is marked by the upsurge of Hindu nationalism on one hand and regional parties devoid of specific ideological position on the other. Most importantly this phase witness a gradual apathy among a large section of population to believe in the efficacy and effectiveness of the Left parties and their leadership to offer a hope and alternative beyond the political tide of the time. Hence less and less discussion on Left politics is taking place these days in public. The gradual decline of the Left in electoral scene of India that got recognized in a massive way in West Bengal 2011 assembly elections got further crystallized with the 2014 LokSabha elections, leading to the collapse of the status of national party for the Left parties. During the past four years, particularly in West Bengal, the space for open public discussion on the future tasks of the Left was narrowed down. Even the space for informal discussion on the Left politics was evaporating following the disenchantment of the wider public with the prevalent party structured political moves of the Left political parties. This situation was further strengthened by the trend of members and supporters of the Left leaving the party in flocks and joining either Trinamul Congress or BJP. On the other side some party members frustrated with the present direction of the leadership indulges in questioning and critiquing the party leadership leading to their expulsion

from the party [CPI (M)]. Some of these expelled/breakaway members of CPI(M) came together with general supporters of the Left politics and formed the forum called Left Collective in West Bengal with the aim of creating free space for discussion, debate and questions on critical issues pertaining to Left politics. After some conventions, in July 2014 the forum organized a public discussion for the first time, bringing two eminent academicians Professor ParthaChatterjee and Professor SobhanlalDuttagupta to speak on what went wrong in Left politics in West Bengal and in India at large and the way forward. At a time of silencing of Left voices and thinking, this public discussion heralded a new way of engaging the masses with the idea of Left politics. This group continued with some lecture series bringing the likes of AmitBhaduri and organizing some protest marches but these were organizational foray rather than intellectual interventions. Even now this forum is lacking direction and vigour with which it started. With new general secretary of CPI(M) SitaramYechury taking over Prakash Karat and Surya Kanta Mishra taking over BimanBasu as the new leadership, may be its time to look towards the old fault lines and rectify them. In that direction the discussion mentioned above is very important more so after the 2016 West Bengal assembly election results.

The Discussion

Professor ParthaChatterjee and Professor SobhanlalDuttagupta discussed threadbare the evolution of the Left party politics in India, its strategies, its fault lines and the agenda for moving forward and the mechanism to achieve that. These were two voices – while Professor Chatterjee stressing more on the practical fault lines in the political strategies in informal sector and identity politics, prescribed the meaningful participation of the Left forces in rights based movement; Professor Duttagupta focusing on theoretical fault lines within the party reflected in the Party resolutions, prescribed a broader understanding of left movements across the world. These two voices however united in highlighting flexible and accommodative ideological and political position for the Left in the days to come in India. The summary of the discussion is presented below.

The context for any future understanding of Left in India must be in the context of parliamentary electoral politics. Two trends can be noticed in the evolution of the Left movement is parliamentary and extra-parliamentary orientation. A major aspect of this parliamentary politics was an apparent movement against capitalist exploitation. It was apparent because in reality these were branded as reformist movement of organizing poor people. The scenario changed with the new economic policies of 1991 following liberalization, privatization and globalization. Before 1991 the demand polity in India was managed by the State but after 1991 there was a gradual retreat of the State particularly from the economic sector. As a result the Left parties that orchestered their ideological and political moves keeping the State at the centre were at a loss. The relevance of the state particularly among the residents of urban areas in areas like media, health, insurance sectors started to decrease day by day with the emergence of e-governance and growth of private sector. Even the labour movements led by the Left that were so long targeted against the State went directionless with the dismantling of the importance of the State in the face of market forces. In urban areas the Left went on with their slogans, picketing and processions that started to lose attraction among the

urbanites. Moreover in rural areas, the zamindari system has been abolished and even there is private ownership of lands the intensity of agricultural work has been reduced drastically as the agricultural products are being less and less profitable these days. 2011 census clearly revealed that though a major chunk of population resides in rural areas, farming is no longer their primary job. Their primary job now is in the informal sector in urban area. Industrialization has been rapid in India but to that extent the formal sector of labourers has not developed, a process that has been designated as a 'jobless growth' process. Meanwhile, the intermediary / ancillary industries developed and the informal sector of labourers boomed. These informal sectors of labourers are not easy to be organized and the Left parties failed to translate their organizational skills of formal sector to the informal one.

The earlier class alliance particularly of the working class was scratched from within. It was not because of any political fault line but because the economic demands changed and a clash of interest erupted between those employed in government sector and those in informal sector or those who are self-employed. In an independent confrontation with the State these group of workers despite being illegal otherwise gets legal guarantee of their job and security from the State. The classic example is that of the hawkers whose jobs very recently have been legitimized by the Parliament. That the huge presence of work force in informal sector is an indication of the fact that the 'reserve army of labour' is no longer useful for industrial capitalized production but very much relevant for vote politics. This fact has been not fully accommodated within the Left political strategies. In this critical context a multi-class alliance is a must for the Left to achieve excluding the industrial class, the high middle class and big landlords.

Different political approach is required to gain popularity in the sphere of informal politics that calls for instrumental politics by moulding ideology in that direction as well. A new approach is required also to understand the relevance and importance of class, caste and identity politics in India. The Left parties lost its salience in its earlier strongholds like Andhra Pradesh and Bihar as the regional parties came up to promote the interests of the ascriptive identities. The Left parties failed to transform their ideology with the changing demands of these identitarian movements. The rigid ideological position of branding these movements as 'political untouchables', the failure to understand the impact of different economic and identitarian demands led other regional parties to come to the centre stage and try to forge alliances among the Dalits(like the Dalit umbrella alliance in UP). The Left kept on their ideological position in a straightjacket mode of a one-to-one struggle between the working class and the industrialists and between the peasants and the landlords. Meanwhile in India the transformations in economic sector particularly after 1991, the cleavages within the poorer section, the difference of demands among the working classes were not been adequately addressed by the Left parties.

In the midst of all these transformations in Indian politics, the Left parties were enjoying the victory of their ideological position in elections after elections particularly in West Bengal but in reality these wins had some underlining reasons of which the most important was by expanding organization and raising membership among the common masses who by default of coming close

to political power readily agreed to join the organization or simply support it and in elections these ideologically and politically naïve masses voted for the Left and the Left equated it with the success of their ideology! This poor equation of the Left became crystal clear with supporters leaving the Party and joining the Party in power after the change of power in West Bengal.

The way forward for the Left parties to re-group and re-organise lies in participating more and more in citizen rights movement and communicating politically less through organization but more through media, particularly social media to broaden their reach. The need of the hour for the Left is to decentralize power and responsibilities in various small organizations across the country and to contemporize ideological and political moves.

The year 2014 marks the 50 th year of the first official rift among the Communist parties in India in 1964 leading to the emergence of CPI(M) and thereafter another rift took place in 1967 leading to the emergence of CPI(ML). Such rifts are not unique to India. Even in Russia such rifts took place between the Bolshevik and Mensheviks in the Russian Social Democratic Party on the question of being the ardent follower of the revolutionary principles of Marxism. So the party split was not seen as a weak point in the evolution of revolutionary movement but a mark of aspiration to achieve a higher and pure form of revolutionary struggle.

In India every time election comes a call is given by the Left parties to vote for a Left Democratic Front but in other times it is only the Left Front that remains active and tries to remain united. So it can be argued that for short term electoral benefits some electoral alliances are made by the Left Front with some other political groups and a Left Democratic Front is presented before the electorate and the Left Front does not pay much heed to estimate the extent of democratic element in the parties with which they forge short term alliance. So when a question of Left alternative is aired it must be seen in the context of Left unity but then again as Indian experience of Left politics suggests the critical question is of unity to be understood among the partners of Left Front or among the partners of Left Democratic Front. Hence the main agenda of imagining a Left alternative must be based on forging Left unity.

The mechanism to go for such an agenda is to fundamentally shift the theoretical understanding of the Left parties. It is a different issue whether the political philosophy of Marxism were analysed rightly or wrongly but the main issue is that there are mental blocs among the Left parties to think beyond some stereotypical understanding of Marxism and it's high time to have flexibility in that understanding. Equally important is to introduce pluralism in thought process of the members of Left parties where in addition to Lenin's pamphlet 'What is To Be Done?' one must give due importance and read the likes of Rosa Luxemburg, Gramsci, Trotsky. The established image in Left parties in India is that the Party is ubiquitous and is posited next to the Almighty with ecclesiastical power of accurate understanding of any and every situation and that the Party is always right and can do no wrong and whoever disagrees with the Party must be termed as anti-Party element. This fundamentalist attitude of Party needs to be done away with if the Left parties hope to re-emerge fruitfully. Another tendency that needs to be rectified is the way people are

being attracted by the present day leaders to the Party and made to act on the dictates of the Party and thereby these people do not see or think beyond the Party. This is achieved by citing instances of whole time dedicated party workers and leaders of yesteryears. True however the fact may be, it is essential that the present day Party workers should not be averse to know the history of the Party and also of other parties in India. By citing history the leaders have turned a bunch of party workers to be anti-historical!

In the Resolution on Ideological issues of the 20 th Party Congress of CPI(M) it is stated in para 5 clause 1.3 that the main ideological enemy of the present day situation for the Left is postmodernism and identity politics which are designated as reactionary forces. This needs to be interrogated seriously. Postmodernism raises some critical and serious questions which may be unacceptable totally for the Marxists but to denounce those questions outright is a rejection of the possibility of pluralism in thought process. Marx's Communist Manifesto cannot be understood fully without a prior reading of Science of Logic by Hegel. Even identity politics with all its dangerous implications should be tackled strategically rather than denouncing once and for all. It must be remembered that Marxism progressed in a dialogue with the contemporary development of science and literature and not bypassing or ignoring them. In clause 1.4 of para 5 of the above mentioned Resolution it is stated that the central contradiction of our time is between Imperialism and Socialism and China, Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea are trying hard to maintain socialism in the face of odds. This is also a sign of being myopic about international situation of struggles against imperialism with a broad based agenda. One must understand the alliance of all left parties in Europe, of the Front of Popular Unity in Latin America and the Ceresca experiment of Greece against neo-liberalism and also against official socialist party of that country. These multi varied experiments must also be included in the official resolution highlighting international situation about the contemporary socialist movements across the world broadening the space of political practice.

On a general level the above arguments can be said in tune with the remarks of scholars working the ways by which the return of the left in post-communist societies can be shaped. They lists – historical legacy of communism in the society,challenges to come to terms with economic reforms,management of social and political conflictsand to response to external factors of global developments. Enlisting these, the scholars remark that "the journey for the post-communist left has just begun and probably will include few more stops…"[1]

Some Missing Links

The enquiries that generated from this discussion were mainly application oriented – of how to start or to re-group in the field among the common supporters of the Left politics. The missing link in the discussion was not the absence of any clue to the above mentioned queries but on the strategic bent of the leadership and party in this critical context. Politics today is al all about strategy and strategy in the present phase of Indian politics is to be clear about choosing and declaring the real political enemy and that means to clarify position on Congress and BJP and also

on regional political parties. The discussion went on theoretical and practical grounds and prescribed a prolonged, lonely but necessarily singular struggle of the Left political forces with the various affected sections of society. Such a prescription needs to be interrogated seriously in the present orientation of the generation. In the yesteryears there was an approach of solidarity to be found through processions, movements and on ideological grounds and a desire to change based on revolutionary spirit. Today we find an increasingly mediated society based on networking through various social forums and idea, action plan and implementation of social movements are all chalked out in the virtual world leading to sudden massive upsurge in the public space and equal sudden ebb in the movement. This was seen in the way the recent anti-corruption movement emerged and eclipsed. This shows the restlessness of the present generation in India that clamour for immediate result. In this context the effectiveness of the call for the 'Long March' to attract the public at large needs to be given a second thought.

On the other side the organizer of the discussion, the Left Collective, need to assess itself critically. The problem with this forum is that till the other day they were so closely aligned with the main party of target, the CPI(M), that it would take long for them to shrug off the CPI(M) brand attitude. This attitude means that to talk and act in terms of the party/group and to believe in the superiority of that party/group in terms of ideology, programme, debates and discussion in comparison with existing parties and group. The Left Collective is lead by members who still believes in the programme, pattern of debates on the lines of anti-imperialism and anti-international finance capital, land reforms and other political thinking of CPI(M). The only area of divergence is that on the very point of their difference with the CPI(M) party the leadership were wrong and they were right! So public discussion of this kind is a crucial test for these leading members of forums like Left Collective to engage with persons having different bend of mind and they must be aware not to bring too many expelled members of CPI(M) party in the forefront of leadership to create an image of the forum being a leftover of the CPI(M) who will be eager to join CPI(M) provided the present leadership gives way to a new breed of leadership and they welcome them. The activities that this forum is indulging like participating in a public platform (*gonomancha*) for a convention for democracy, secularism and the rights of the working class along with CPI(ML) and other Leftists wings of public movement like Radical Socialist, MajdoorParishad and SamajikNyayBichar Mancha led by the recently expelled CPI(M) party member and sitting MLA AbdurRezzakMolla.

Today the question is about finding alternative – alternative way of political functioning beyond the given political outfits of the Left Front. This is because the public has totally rejected the present state of things among parties of the Left Front particularly the CPI(M) in all its orientations – leadership, party structure, political strategy and political attitude. So when one has to search an alternative it must be an original indigenous attempt, not only in raising questions but also in the method adopted to find answers. And finding answers to re-gain popularity in political system is about adopting correct political strategy. Indian politics is nearing a stage, and especially after the consolidation 'Moditva' governance style, a stage of a war like situation. With more and more private investment in public sectors like insurance, retail and transport. It is prudent that in any

war like situation one must have specific friends and enemies. In Indian situation the Left cannot have both the BJP and the Congress as it enemies. If it chooses to do so it is left with other federal forces of which the Trinamul Congress is the most prominent one. The official Left as well as forums like Left Collective is still willing to have the triad (BJP, Congress and Trinamul Congress) as their collective enemies at the same time. This is the critical question and the Left has to specify for strategic reasons the party among the triad which it could support to win over the war like situation that is engulfing Indian politics rapidly because excluding these three parties no political party at present in India cannot have any positive imagination to come to power nationally.

This public discussion gave a call for inclusionary politics going beyond the cocoon of a particular class oriented political strategy. The public discussion arranged by the Left Collective raised a voice of conscience for the Left in West Bengal. The mass connectivity rallies or *jattha*, as it is called is being organized across the state by the Left leadership in order to increase connectivity. The Left political parties presently are in a dilemma - how to connect with people - through such rallies and movements in the ground or through strategic partnership with secular forces electorally.

Conclusion

When Left unity in India is needed more than ever before in India, sadly, the Left forces are breaking up within themselves. The latest fad in the line is Left Collective. Reading Jacques Derrida one can find Derrida asking something to forums like Left Collective in the following words - "Someone, you or me, comes forward and says: "*I would like to learn to live finally*". Finally, but why?….If it – learning to live – remains to be done, it can happen only between life and death. Neither in life nor in death *alone*. What happens between the two, and between all the two's one likes, such as between life and death, can only *maintain itself* with some ghost, can only talk with or about some ghost. So it is necessary to learn spirits…The time of the "learning to live", a time without tutelary present, would amount to this, to which the exordium is leading us: to learn to live with ghosts, in the upkeep, the conversation, the company or the companionship, in the commerce without commerce of ghosts….And this being-with specters would also be, not only but also, a *politics* of memory, of inheritance, and of generations."[2]

It is within this "politics of memory, inheritance and generations" that any new formation within Left in India has to place itself and a constant comparison will go on with its parent organization and to what extent and how it can be a genuine promising Left alternative. So the 'specter of communism' and the 'specter of CPI(M)' both will haunt Left Collective in its future advancement. Alternative policies for foreign, economic, social, defense policy is what counts and hopefully in the coming days the Left Collective will evolve those based on their discussion with all sections of Left supporters.

One contemporary commentator on Left politics argues - "Left theory has always been linked with political practice. Thinking in action is the left's key weapon. At this critical turning point, where

all bets on the outcome of the crisis are off and the best and the worst stand in close proximity, the idea of communism has the potential to revitalize the theoretical thinking and reverse the de-politicizing tendency of late capitalism. Recent politics has attempted to ban and foreclose conflict. The idea of communism confronts widespread de-politicization by inducing new political subjectivities and returning to a popular voluntarism"[3]

Left Collective has started this popular voluntarism. But it has to answer lots of critical questions to make any meaningful presence in India politics. But their effort is commendable for a new beginning and new beginnings are always essential because a maxim says – 'Try again, Fail again, Fail better'. In any imaginations of Left alternative one should not be adventurous to create new left political parties but to streamline the present left parties into the contemporary politics, economics and cultural spaces of the neo-liberal global order. As evident by left oppositional movements across the world, the youth are with such uprisings. It is argued by Susan Watkins that "In all the discussion of the symmetries of the left-right anti-establishment protest, this major asymmetry is often overlooked. Supporters of Trump, UKIP and Le Pen tend to be middle age or over; the young are breaking left."[4] In India the problem however lies with the understanding of the contemporary by the Left political leadership. The sooner revision of such understanding begins the better it will be. However putting the entire Left rejuvenation process in electorally beneficial line without a parallel theoretical and programmatic framework will create confusion among the rank and file of left workers. Such trend is being seen in the recent episodes of threats from party workers to leave the party (CPI[M]) by questioning the party'shalf-hearted effort to sick to a post electoral alliance with Congress in West Bengal which is contrary to the equidistance from Congress and BJP programme adopted at the last Party Congress. As a very recent argument state –"the class struggle that is endemic to capitalism cannot be seen merely in electoral domain…..a system that produces diabolical levels of poverty is not capable of making poverty history. For that the structures have to be transformed, the final *aim* of a communist movement. To abandon that final aim is to leave society with the illusion of small reforms."[5] Such understanding is also responsible for a probable distanciation between the CPIM) and other Left forces (CPI, RSP, Forward Bloc, SUCI-C, CPI[ML])trying to forge broader left unity across the country to resist the right reactionary forces. Even the Left Collective now coming under new banner of Young Bengal is also staging protests before the state committee quarter of West Bengal CPI(M) office to come out of a clear programme in its struggle against the right reactionary forces.

The final questioning in imaging a left alternative in India is the space where the Left unity is going to be re-surfaced – is it the 'spaces of hope' by attempting to lead the struggles of the multitude in their daily antagonisms with the government of the day and thereby winning their hearts or is it the 'spaces of power' by attempting to coalesce with any secular forces to oust right reactionary forces and come to power to frame people-oriented policies to win the hearts of the multitude. In the former it will indeed be a long and protracted path, nevertheless exciting and visible, in the latter it will definitely lead to what Professor DwaipayanBhattacharyay calls 'governmentalization of locality' without a corresponding 'localization of the government'.[6] Hence after getting electorally marginalized in Indian politics the Left forces must

again go back to the grassroots mobilization strategy that helped the Left in consolidating itself in earlier decades. So the call must be –'Go Back to the Future'.

Notes and References

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Review Section

Divided Cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Mostar

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Calame, John and Charlesworth, Esther.Foreword by Woods, Lebbeus. *Divided Cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Mostar*, **University of Pennsylvania Press, (2012), 280.**

Calame & Charlesworth provide a unique analysis of five"Divided Cities: Beirut, Belfast, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia." Each state has many cultural, religious, and political differences. However, they also are worth noting for the many commonalities between each other such as:

a. Existential Factors-Emerging Global Conditions

b. Stop-Gap Solutions of Separation

c. The Influence of Western Secularism

d. Urban Pathologies of Communities at War with each other

Calame and Charlesworth posit that there is a need to remove the barriers of separating groups and create new openings for dialogue and exchange.The text is dedicated to never having constructed these barriers, to begin with.The text describes how and why partitions happen. Although, they do not try to offer theoretical remedies, plans, or policy prescriptions for divided cities. Their interviews and field work helps to isolate and explain patterns linking the five cities.

In the section referred to as "Warning Beacons" the chapter highlights how the five cities have been internally partitioned. They note that in particular, the city managers had much difficulty pre-partition maintaining order before the final partition. The Warning Beacons Included:

1. Partitioned cities can act as a warning beacon for all cities where intercommunal rivalry threatens normal urban functioning security. It highlighted that every city contains ethnic and cultural fault lines and these spaces are negotiated very tenuously.

2. There is a case of even more partitions and polarization,-for example, Montreal, Cincinnati, Baghdad, and others.

Divided cities are linked with civil wars, intrastate wars, interethnic wars, and physical barriers such as Israel's partition: "security fence/separation barrier" as these include:

a. Existential Factors-Emerging Global Conditions

b. Stop-Gap Solutions of Separation

c. The Influence of Western Secularism

d. Urban Pathologies of Communities at War with each other

Moreover they described the Symptoms &The Illness as: the dysfunctional relationship between cities and walls are a result of occidental urban culture. It included Ethnic rivalries in urban partitions obscure even deeper socio-economic problems. They question was it an issue of conspiratorial politics or homegrown prejudice?Are partitions themselves an admission to government failure?Cities are rarely divided by their own citizens they are often divided as a result of external forces

When describing the cost of partition the authors explain the negative impacts are economic, social, political, and geographic. Divided cities tend to reinforce social difference and weaken the city's capacity to contend with larger forces external to itself. Walls are the product of a diverse vulnerability that erodes traditional urban society.They even call it the cousins: The Ghetto, abandoned core, the neighborhood redlined. This is for the authors an example of the failure of the social contract/

Furthermore, in the section of Cities & Segregation the authors relate that historical cities and walls have had a relationship. Physical barricades have helped functional separate between civilized and uncivilized domains for resident communities. He gives the example of Rome and Egypt among many. City walls provide traditional infrastructure. It enhanced security as well as created distinct urban identities. It did one of two things: 1. Protect against external forces or 2. Counter-act social assimilation.

In terms of the legacy of nonphysical partitions we have the examples: Little Italy, China Towns, and other ethnic enclaves— residing in America. Perimeter walls and the urban nucleus of Cities grew inside fortified walls: Ur, Erbil, and Babylon— incubated a multicultural identity inside its walls. Fortifications of the perimeter became more important in time creating sharp distinctions in life in and outside the city walls. The demise of the medieval walled city began when the building

and maintenance became to expense the city managers abandoned this strategy and began creating enclaves as visible and invisible barricades creating new internal threats.

Beyond these issues they described scale and group identity by reminding us that a city's scale, infrastructure does not have to limit the number of different beliefs or distinct social networks that coexist within its boundaries. One example would be Moore's *Utopia* (96,000 Max Pop). From here they cover the urban ethnic ghetto. This ghetto would systematically disenfranchise an ethnic group on which the urban economy depended on. This would by-product of customary and institutionalized racial prejudice. Ex. Jewish Ghettos (Venetian)

Then we have what they referred to as the hardening and physical partition. The strategy of systematic exclusion developed in conjunction with cities since their earliest appearance in the western tradition. This continued through the 20 th Century and was frequently paranoid, defensive and chauvinistic impulses. They often became permanent and it created insider and outsiders.

Beirut is an example of a divided city that has a rich and often troubled past. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, a significant Christian minority tried to create a state that could exist in a sea of Muslim states bordering it. To complicate the matters more so we have the Arab-Israeli conflicted this directly put the state in harm's way. The geography and multicultural layout of the city made it a hotbed that was attempted to be controlled via a Green-Line. West Beirut was Muslim & PLO and The East predominantly Christian. Rapid growth in the city escalated tension with groups competing for diverging interests and power.

In the 1970s, two major events pushed the fragile situation in Lebanon to a breaking point: Jordan's attack against the PLO in its border and increased Shi'ite support for the PLO cause. Then were multiple invasions by Israel and Jordan, each with different political and military purposes. Each time was a slap in the face of the Lebanese leadership which hinged on collapse. Throughout Lebanon, there were shortages of food, supplies, and energy as the problem reached a breaking point bringing their government to its knees.

On the eve of civil war, the Maronite leadership's authority and legitimacy were doubted as their over dependence on foreign Christian leadership in Europe backfired on them and they paid a major price. The government made key political mistakes in thinking that Christian interests were not compatible with Muslim ones. The key point being missed the government broke the social contract and failed on the socio-economic side while focusing way too much on sectarian differences.

Moreover a city that was Once mixed racially and ethnically these communities were enclaves and this increase in enclaves only worked to exacerbate problems. Finally, in 1989, there was a move to re-configure the power structure for sharing power between Muslims and Christians sharing equal seats and having learned a valuable lesson that beyond green lines are psychological demarcations eerily similar to Israel.

Now they focused our attention on Belfast. After giving a short background into the history of Northern Ireland, the authors get right into the meat of a concept called the Peaceline which puts communities of minority Catholics in direct competition with a Protestant majority. In this peace line, the Catholics vigilantly lead a tenuous co-existence with their neighbor. The Peaceline was designed to self-police because the Catholic neighborhoods were really left to fend for themselves, almost like a neighborhood watch, except with no real oversight or authority.

In 1969, tensions came to a simmer as the riots got out of control and the police had to intervene against the Protestant rioters to protect the Catholics. However, in reality, they were unable to control this intrastate civil war, which beyond faith drew issues of socio-economic problems and political animosities. The continued violence in 1969 led to further enclaves being developed and entrenched fault-lines being etched. The British soldiers even came in which initially assuaged the fears of the Catholics but, later there was a realization that this only lead to even more partition and stark separations from which arguably the city never recovered.

Their work was unique unlike they were able to provide insights into the social, psychological, and economic devastation caused by the Troubles. They helped us understand that beyond the people's origins the closer you were to the interfaces or Peacelines in the working class neighborhoods, the more likely you were to suffer from discriminatory socio- economic policies. Which makes us take pause and wonder, did the leadership use the ethnic conflict to compensate for the lack of policy initiative and vision?

Then we have Jerusalem is a unique city because it is not one but, rather separate metropolises because on one side there is a modern country and other the decaying vein that is totally dependent on others for its survival. The story of the Arab-Israeli is a long and troubling one where factors such as colonization, genocide, and political revolutions led to many wars. Finally, in 1967, we have the Green-line which the Palestinians have held to the basis of any peace negotiations. However, even this Green-line has been a very polarizing aspect of the history of the region because it has left the Palestinians, for the most part, unable to make a living and has made economic vitality hard to come by for Israel.

Even by 1947 Jerusalem had become a patchwork configuration with no monolithic communities on either side of the divide but, there was increasingly a move towards further separate and homogenous development and these were the precursors to the formal and physical partition. Britain quickly escaped the region as the ethnic tensions and political struggle there was not something they could stomach. The Israeli radicals even bombed their buildings and the authority of the British was questionable at best with the Israelis already making road blocks and barriers. Then a year later there would a formal agreement between the Israelis and Jordanians on the armistice agreement

After the 1948 conflict, we had the agreement to a Green-line which was temporary and had a number of no-man lands in order to purposely avoid or delay further conflict zones. There was an

assumption that this would be a temporary stop gap with the hope that there would be some kind of diplomatic resolution which never came to fruition. In a bit of cruel irony, the Jordanians used the Palestinians as a political tool to gain territory and the East Jerusalem side suffered greatly while the Israeli side experienced tremendous immigration and direct investment. The Palestinians were left in shatters and unable to make a living.

After 1967 War Moshe Dayan stripped away the hideous old barriers and barricades to allow the city once again to heal and reach its old organic zenith. However, in 2002 led by the extreme right-wing leader Ariel Sharon they built a security fence that cut through much Palestinian territory violating the Green-line with the justification that was necessary to create defensible borders and security.

The Impact was quite clear as on one side of the divide you had a country that was thriving and never felt the pains of partition. However, on the Palestinian side, you had Third World Level dereliction and neglect. In terms of identity the loss of land, economic independence, the systematic disenfranchisement by the Israeli state it worked to condition the Palestinians to a slow death sentence. Unable to make a living or function without outside help the conditions of the partition crippled them, and this occurrence even drew criticism of "Apartheid" towards the Israeli state. Today the Israeli state actively pursues settler development on the Palestinian side to make legitimate it claims even to Palestinian land and no man's land. On the East side of Jerusalem, dereliction and depravity are a reality of life and the Green-Line remains entrenched in the mental landscape of its residents.

The authors further examine Mostar and Nicosia and once again we are reminded of the fact that partitions are no longer the exception. Rather they are now the rule when we examine the ethnic, social, political problems in cities. Governments and policy makers lack the political will to correct long term the problems faced by society and rather prefer short term solutions to deep historical problems. The dangers of these failures are that people are now becoming more and more used to partitions.

Finally, although Calame and Charlesworth stop short of giving a judgement as they raise awareness of certain policy issues that through an increasingly globalized world that seems to pop up nearly everywhere. When governments and policy makers lack the will to do the work of long term reconciliation and rebuilding, they have moved towards partitions or building walls. The barriers can be physical like in the case of the security fence or they can be imagined like the Beirut Greenline which although not always a physical barrier with its existence had the psychological effect of dividing many groups of people. The imaginary lines even today have divided and subdivided people. Those that suffer most are those who are from the lowest socio-economic rung as they become prisoners or partitioned border and live a life that is severely restricted by physical and imagined barriers, which acts to marginalize people for generations. They have managed to change the perceptions of people and now policy makers have taken an easy out by ignoring the

problems society suffers from and instead of healing them, they are further exasperating the problem by continuing pushing partition and physical divisions. This is a seminal conversation in a world that has Europe in severe economic decline, the Middle East suffering a major refugee crisis, and Asia on the rise. The text is ideal for policy makers, professors of history, economics, geography, and global politics.

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